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INTRODUCTION 
The right way to think about this complex set of issues is 
not clear, but it is clear that the [present] competitive 
paradigm cannot be fully appropriate.1 
 
This Article argues that competition law is best seen as a form of 
public law—the law that governs the governing of the state—and not 
as simply a form of private market regulation. Using the experiences 
of “Asian capitalism,” it shows how capitalist markets everywhere—
including those of Europe and the United States—are in fact much 
more diversified and variegated than the orthodox model of 
competition law presumes, and that this demands a form of regulation 
that is innately political rather than simply technical. Orthodox 
competition regimes address this complexity by segregating non-
standard capitalisms into alternative doctrinal jurisprudences, but this 
renders conceptually invisible the political balancing that these 
different forms of capitalism, and their different dynamics of 
competition, require and innately provoke. Recognizing that 
competition law is ultimately a form of public law allows us to 
visualize this inevitable process of political balancing, and thereby 
begin to address the issues it raises. 
The political character of competition regulation in Asia is well 
recognized.2 But its implications for understanding competition law 
writ large are, as yet, unexplored. This is because, at least insofar as 
the legal and economic literature of the European and Anglo-
American worlds is concerned, analyses of the competition laws of 
non-Euro-American locales invariably proceed according to a 
particular logic.  
First, the analysis reminds us how competition law is 
conceptualized in the Euro-American world—a particular 
conceptualization that we will hereinafter refer to as the “orthodox 
model.”3 Since the late 1970s, that Euro-American model has been 

1. J. Bradford DeLong & Lawrence H. Summers, The ‘New Economy’: Background, 
Historical Perspective, Questions, and Speculations, 4 ECON. REV. 29, 34 (2001). 
2. See, e.g., Lawrence S. Liu, In Fairness We Trust?—Why Fostering Competition Law 
and Policy Ain't Easy in Asia (Soc. Sci. Res’ch Netw’k Working Paper, Oct. 19, 2004), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=610822. For a description of what constitutes ‘Asia’ for 
the purposes of this Article, and why, see infra notes 130-135 and accompanying text.   
3. The term “neoliberal” is often given a pejorative meaning. See Bob Jessop, Putting 
Neoliberalism in its Time and Place: A Response to the Debate, 12 SOCIAL ANTHROPOLOGY 
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the dominant, if not the only, means for thinking about competition 
law.4 It is the model that presently informs the global diffusion of 
competition law and competition regulation,5 and it is the model that 
is now universally espoused by most developmental agencies and 
most competition law professors and scholars as the only appropriate 
way for competition law to be structured.6  
The analysis then compares the law of its non-Euro-American 
subject with this orthodox model.7 Where it finds significant 
differences, it then concludes that these differences either: (1) evince 
de facto deficiencies in the subject jurisdiction’s competition law that 
need to be fixed;8 or—more rarely—(2) evince that market 
competition in the subject jurisdiction is “different” in some 
significant way from that found in “the West.”9 

65 (2013); Oliver Marc Hartwich, Neoliberalism: The Genesis of a Political Swearword 4-27 
(The Ctr. for Indep. Studies Occasional Paper No. 114, 2009). For this reason, this Article calls 
what is perhaps more commonly termed the ‘neoliberal’ model, the ‘orthodox model.’ 
Compare infra notes 24-45 and accompanying text (describing the orthodox model), with 
Hubert Buch-Hansen & Angela Wigger, Revisiting 50 Years of Market-making: The 
Neoliberal Transformation of European Competition Policy, 17 REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 20 
(2010) (describing the ‘neoliberal model’). 
4. See, e.g., Einer Elhauge & Damien Geradin, GLOBAL COMPETITION LAW AND 
ECONOMICS, at v-vi (2d ed. 2011); Barak Orbach, How Antitrust Lost Its Goal, 81 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 2253 (2013). See generally DAVID J. GERBER, GLOBAL COMPETITION: LAW, 
MARKETS AND GLOBALIZATION 79-120 (2010).    
5. For a discussion of what is meant by ‘competition regulation,’ as contrasted against 
‘competition law,’ see infra notes 120-25 and accompanying text. 
6. See, e.g., Ngai-Ling Sum, Cultural Political Economy of Competitiveness, 
Competition Law, and Competition Policy in Asia, in ASIAN CAPITALISM AND THE 
REGULATION OF COMPETITION: TOWARDS A REGULATORY GEOGRAPHY OF GLOBAL 
COMPETITION LAW 79, 79 (Michael W. Dowdle et al. eds., 2013); David J. Gerber, 
Convergence in the Treatment of Dominant Firm Conduct: The United States, the European 
Union, and the Institutional Embeddedness of Economics, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 951, 956 (2010); 
Buch-Hansen & Wigger, supra note 3, at 40-41.   
7. See, e.g., Toshiaki Takigawa & Mark Williams, Guest Editors’ Note: Asian 
Competition Laws, 54 ANTITRUST BULL. 1, 1-4 (2009); cf. Sum, supra note 6, at 85-92 
(describing use by World Bank and Asian Development Bank of the orthodox model as ‘best-
practice’ in domestic competition regulation).  
8. Cf. David J. Gerber, Asia and Global Competition Law Convergence, in ASIAN 
CAPITALISM AND THE REGULATION OF COMPETITION: TOWARDS A REGULATORY 
GEOGRAPHY OF GLOBAL COMPETITION LAW 36, 36 (Michael W. Dowdle et al. eds., 2013) 
(“[c]onvergence [with the orthodox model] . . . is widely considered to be the only currently 
viable strategy for global competition law development”). There are too many examples of 
these to cite. See, e.g., Kenneth M. Davidson, Creating Effective Competition Institutions: 
Ideas for Transitional Economies, 6 ASIAN-PACIFIC L. & POL’Y J. 71, 74 (2005); Liu, supra 
note 2. 
9. See, e.g., Gerber, supra note 8; Tony Prosser, Competition Law and the Role of the 
State in East Asia, in ASIAN CAPITALISM AND THE REGULATION OF COMPETITION: TOWARDS 
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This Article reminds us that there is another possibility that may 
underlie such differences. This is the possibility that the difference 
shows that some of the presumptions that inform the orthodox model 
are simply wrong—and that the competition law of “the other”—in 
this case Asia—is not merely different, it is in fact affirmatively 
superior.  
Along these lines, this Article will show that at the end of the 
day, the distinctly political character of Asian competition regulation 
derives from that fact not that it is different, but that it is better, 
because contrary to the presumptions of the orthodox model, 
competition regulation is everywhere an innately political form of 
regulation known as “public law.” To say that competition law is a 
form of public law is to say that it is a kind of law that is ultimately 
concerned with the construction and governance of the state,10 and not 
simply with the regulation of private markets. It is to say that 
competition law is an innately political form of regulation, in that it 
involves the constant, political balancing and rebalancing of a wide 
diversity of public and private concerns.11 This runs contrary to what 
we are calling the “orthodox model” of competition law, which 
demands that competition law be insulated from politics.12 
Of course, many working out of the orthodox model accept that 
competition law must take into account substantive considerations 
that are not classically economic in nature, considerations that they 
often characterize as “political considerations.”13 But as used herein, 

A REGULATORY GEOGRAPHY OF GLOBAL COMPETITION LAW 228 (Michael W. Dowdle et al. 
eds., 2013); cf. Julián Peña, The Limits of Competition Law in Latin America, in THE GLOBAL 
LIMITS OF COMPETITION LAW 236, 243 (Ioannis Lianos & D. Daniel Sokol eds., 2012). 
10.  See infra notes 385-87 and accompanying text.  
11. See infra notes 284-314 and accompanying text. 
12. See Imelda Maher, The Institutional Structure of Competition Law, in ASIAN 
CAPITALISM AND THE REGULATION OF COMPETITION: TOWARDS A REGULATORY 
GEOGRAPHY OF GLOBAL COMPETITION LAW 55, 61-75 (Michael W. Dowdle et al. eds., 
2013); Imelda Maher, Functional and Normative Delegation to Non-Majoritarian Institutions: 
The Case of the European Competition Network, 7 COMP. EUR. POL. 414, 416, 424, 428 
(2009); Gesner Oliveira, Eduardo Luiz Machado, Lucas Martins Novaes & Carla Beatriz 
Guimarães Ferreira, Aspects of the Independence of Regulatory Agencies and Competition 
Advocacy 5 (Getúlio Vargas Found. (NGA), Int’l Competition Network, Competition Policy 
Implementation Working Grp., Subgroup 3, 2005); Pradeep S. Mehta & Simon J. Evenett, 2 
POLITICS TRIUMPHS ECONOMICS? POLITICAL ECONOMY AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF 
COMPETITION LAW AND REGULATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 1-2 (Pradeep S. Mehta & 
Simon J. Evenett eds., 2009).  
13. See, e.g., Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 
1051, 1051-52 (1979). 
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politics—our more precise term will be “political regulation”—refers 
to something different: it refers not to a particular class of substantive 
regulatory considerations, but to a particular class of processes 
through which such non-economic considerations can be injected into 
regulatory decision making. More specifically, it refers to decision 
making processes that involve negotiations over incommensurate 
interests.14 By contrast, when people working out of the orthodox 
model advocate taking particular political considerations into account, 
they nevertheless require or assume that those considerations be 
accounted for in an objective and technical manner that does not 
involve or allow for bargaining over incommensurate interests.15  
As shall be shown below, the orthodox model’s hostility to 
politics derives from a misconception about the structure of capitalist 
systems. The orthodox model originated in the particular experience 
of the advanced industrial economies of the “North Atlantic”16 during 
the twentieth century, an experience that is often referred to as 
Fordism.17 As such, it presumes that the national economy it regulates 
is—or should strive to be—more or less Fordist, and moreover, that it 
is what we will call “monistically” Fordist: meaning that no other 
forms or varieties of capitalism significantly inform the national 
economic system.18 Consistent with Max Weber’s understanding of 
modern capitalism, what he called “rational capitalism,” the orthodox 
model sees this monistic capitalism as being properly founded upon a 
rational set of objective economic principles that in turn objectively 

14. See, e.g., JOHN DUNN, THE CUNNING OF UNREASON: MAKING SENSE OF POLITICS 
133 (2000); see infra notes 284-97, for a discussion of ‘political regulation.’  
15. See infra notes 284-85 and accompanying text. 
16. The particular geography that this Article refers to as the “North Atlantic”—i.e., the 
advanced industrial economies of the United States and Western Europe—tracks that which 
many refer to as “the West.” But as with the term ‘neoliberal,’ the term “the West” carries a lot 
of political and ideological, as well as simply conceptual, baggage that I would like to avoid in 
this Article. In particular, “the West” is often used to refer to a particular—and often 
mythologized—cultural geography. By contrast, “North Atlantic” is meant to refer to a 
particular economic geography. 
17. See infra notes 106-09 and accompanying text. 
18. See Angela Wigger & Andreas Nölke, Enhanced Roles of Private Actors in EU 
Business Regulation and the Erosion of Rhenish Capitalism: The Case of Antitrust 
Enforcement, 45 J. COMMON MARKET STUD. 487 (2007); see also Stephen Wilks, The 
European Competition Network: What has Changed? 18 (paper for European Union Studies 
Association [EUSA] 10th Biennial Conference, May 17-19, 2007), available at 
http://aei.pitt.edu/8067/1/wilks%2Ds%2D08h.pdf. But cf. DANI RODRIK, ONE ECONOMICS, 
MANY RECIPES: GLOBALIZATION, INSTITUTIONS, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH (2007). 
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dictate the construction and demands of competition law.19 In such an 
environment, there would obviously be no room for politics: politics 
would merely introduce extraneous and often corrupting inputs into 
the regulatory process. 
This Article uses the alternative experiences of the Asian 
regional economy—a.k.a. “Asian capitalism”20—to show that in fact, 
national economies are comprised of a diversity of capitalisms; that 
this diversity is balanced differently in different kinds of economic 
geographies; and that there are therefore multiple forms of “market 
competition” operating within any single national economy. For this 
reason, the regulation of market competition must also adopt a variety 
of forms, and more importantly must balance the needs for and of the 
different forms of capitalisms operating within national borders. This 
is an innately political act.  In North Atlantic capitalisms, this 
diversity in the kinds of market competition has been “invisibilized”21 
by the doctrinal structure that competition regulation22 takes in the 
United States and the European Union. But ultimately, as we shall 
see, even in the United States and Europe, competition law takes the 
form of what we are calling political regulation. It is a form of public 
law.23 
The rest of this Article proceeds as follows. Part I gives an 
overview of what we are calling the orthodox model of competition 
law. In short, the orthodox model seeks to promote the economic and 
social well-being of society by allocating the surplus value generated 
by production to consumers through market competition based on 

19. Compare MAX WEBER, 1 ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE 
SOCIOLOGY 164, 164-66 (1978), with RICHARD SWEDBERG, MAX WEBER AND THE IDEA OF 
ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY 27 (1998). See also Bob Jessop, The Complexities of Competition and 
Competitiveness: Challenges for Competition Law and Economic Governance in Variegated 
Capitalism, in ASIAN CAPITALISM AND THE REGULATION OF COMPETITION: TOWARDS A 
REGULATORY GEOGRAPHY OF GLOBAL COMPETITION LAW 96, 112-13 (Michael W. Dowdle 
et al. eds., 2013) (noting tendency of people working out of Anglo-American tradition to 
presume that all capitalism resembles rational capitalism). See generally id. (exploring the 
antecedents to and emergence of the orthodox model’s particular understanding of capitalism).    
20. See infra notes 126-244 and accompanying text. 
21. It’s not a proper word, but I like it. 
22. In fact, national market competition is regulated by a variety of legal regimes in 
addition to the positive competition law. As used herein, competition ‘regulation’ refers to the 
sum total of the regulatory regimes that significantly and intentionally shape market regulation 
in a particular country—including, for example, in addition to competition law, intellectual 
property law, labor law, consumer protection, etc. See infra notes 120-25 and accompanying 
text. 
23. See infra notes 384-437 and accompanying text. 
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price. But this model is not of universal utility: there are several kinds 
of market environments in which price competition does not promote 
economic consumer welfare or social well-being. These include 
export-oriented economies, economies based on product competition, 
volatile economies, economies for citizenship goods, and small 
economies. 
Part II then explores what we are calling Asian capitalism, and 
how Asian capitalism compares to and contrasts with the economic 
presumptions that underlie the orthodox model. One aspect of Asian 
capitalism in particular that stands out in this regard is its variegated 
character. In contrast to the monistic nature of North Atlantic 
capitalism, Asian capitalism appears to encompass a wide diversity of 
capitalisms—and correspondingly, a wide diversity of forms of 
market competition—within its various national regulatory 
penumbras.  
In Part III, we explore how this variegated character upsets a 
number of core presumptions that inform the orthodox model, and in 
the end causes competition regulation to assume a political-regulatory 
character. This is because different forms of capitalism that comprise 
the national economies of Asia serve different—and often 
incommensurate—social purposes. Their contributions and collective 
economic coherence can therefore only be structured by balancing 
conflicts, not by resolving them. This is the realm of politics, and it is 
what makes competition law and regulation in Asia innately political 
rather than simply technical in character. 
Part IV then shows that the economies of the North Atlantic are 
also variegated, and that, in fact, their implementation of competition 
law also evinces a correspondingly political-regulatory character. It is 
just that this political regulatory character is masked by doctrinal 
differentiations that treat the regulation of non-price-competitive 
forms of capitalism as exceptions to the orthodox model rather than as 
alternatives to that model. Finally, in Part V, we will see how all this 
makes competition law a form of public law, insofar as both Asia and 
the North Atlantic are concerned. At the end of the day, competition 
law is about nothing less than the construction and regulation of the 
state itself. 
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I. THE ORTHODOX MODEL FOR COMPETITION LAW: 
RATIONALE, LIMITS, AND PRESUMPTIONS  
In order to explore for how and why Asian capitalism regulates 
competition the way it does, we first need to examine what it is that 
the orthodox model consists of, and what are its limitations. Its 
limitations, in particular, are generally overlooked in the orthodox 
literature, but understanding them is critical to our project. As we 
shall see, these limitations stem from particular presumptions the 
orthodox model makes about the social-economic environment it 
seeks to regulate. These presumptions, which parallel the particular 
capitalist-industrial ordering known as Fordism, are by no means 
universal. We shall see in Part II that they do not accurately describe 
the situation found in Asian capitalism, and this will explain why 
Asian capitalism regulates competition the way it does, i.e., by relying 
more on politics and less on economic expertise.  
A. The Rationale for the Orthodox Model24 
There is a surprising level of agreement about the theoretical 
foundations that should inform global and domestic practices and 
doctrines of competition law. Perhaps no other area of law evinces 
such an unchallenged theoretical underpinning.25 This is not to 
suggest that there are not disagreements within the field over 
theoretical questions: economic libertarians, such as those associated 
with the Chicago school, are less distrustful of monopolistic practices 
than those working out of the orthodox theory;26 German ordoliberals 
pay more attention to the democratic implication of market 
competition than does more orthodox theorizing, which tends to focus 
more narrowly on efficiency.27 But at the end of the day, the general 
theoretical justifications for competition law stand relatively 

24. For a good, short overview of the orthodox rationale for North Atlantic competition 
law, see TONY PROSSER, THE LIMITS OF COMPETITION LAW: MARKETS AND PUBLIC 
SERVICES 17-20 (2005). 
25. See also Maher, The Institutional Structure, supra note 12, at 61-75; Gerber, supra 
note 6, at 956.  
26. Gordon B. Spivack, The Chicago School Approach to Single Firm Exercises of 
Monopoly Power: A Response, 52 ANTITRUST L.J. 651 (1983). 
27. See infra notes 417-22 and accompanying text. 
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uncontested from within the field, even as they find more 
considerable opposition outside of that field.28 
At the heart of the orthodox model is the pursuit of a condition 
commonly referred to as “consumer sovereignty”29—“the set of 
societal arrangements that causes that economy to act primarily in 
response to the aggregate signals of consumer demand, rather than in 
response to government directives or the preferences of individual 
businesses.”30 Consumer sovereignty optimizes distribution of 
resources so as to maximize the market’s benefit to consumers, both 
in terms of maximizing consumers’ aggregate material benefits, i.e., 
“consumer welfare”31 and maximizing aggregate consumer choice, 
i.e., “consumer democracy.”32  
Many see consumer sovereignty as an essential contributor to an 
effective democratic system of government.33 Of all the possible 
economic classes towards which a market might direct its benefits, 
the class of the consumer is generally regarded as the most 
inclusive.34 Consistent with general understandings of the purpose of 
democracy, consumer sovereignty is seen to allow the greatest portion 
of the population to get the greatest benefit from a free market 
system: 
In a rich society like ours . . . [we] must be concerned with the 
mechanisms for getting people what they want, no matter how 
these wants were acquired. This view I find very close to the idea 

28. For a rare exception, see Frederick M. Rowe, The Decline of Antitrust and the 
Delusions of Models: The Faustian Pact of Law and Economics, 72 GEO. L.J. 1511 (1983-
1984). Cf. Prosser, supra note 9, at 17-39 (critiquing the orthodox model from outside the 
field—i.e., from the perspective of public law). 
29. See also Neil W. Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Consumer Sovereignty: A Unified 
Theory of Antitrust and Consumer Protection Law, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 713 (1997).  The notion 
of “consumer sovereignty” appears to have been originally developed by William H. Hutt.  See 
William Hutt, Economic Method and the Concept of Competition, 2 S. AFR. J. ECON. 3 (1934); 
see also William H. Hutt, The Concept of Consumers’ Sovereignty, 50 ECON. J. 66 (March 
1940).    
30.  Averitt & Lande, supra note 29, at 715.   
31.  See K.J. Cseres, The Controversies of the Consumer Welfare Standard, 3 COMP. L. 
REV. 121 (2007). 
32.  John D. Haskell & Luigi Rossi, Where Does the Critique of Consumer-Based 
Economic Governance Stand Today? (Harvard IGLP, Working Paper No. 2011/4, 2011), 
available at http://works.bepress.com/luigirussi/15.  
33.  See GIULIANO AMATO, ANTITRUST AND THE BOUNDS OF POWER 2-3 (1997); 
Haskell & Russi, supra note 32; see also infra notes 417-22 and accompanying text 
(discussing ordoliberalism).  
34.  See, e.g., WALTER LIPPMANN, DRIFT AND MASTERY: AN ATTEMPT TO DIAGNOSE 
THE CURRENT UNREST 54-55 (Prentice Hall 1961) (1914). 
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of democracy or freedom—the idea of normally letting each 
member of society decide what is good for himself, rather than 
have someone else play a paternal role. It is also very closely 
related to the idea of efficiency – efficiency in the use of re-
sources for the greatest possible satisfaction of the needs and 
desires of people. It is understandable why the full achievement 
of consumer sovereignty has been called ‘ideal output.’35 
According to the orthodox model, competition law promotes 
consumer sovereignty primarily by allocating the surplus value of 
production—the difference between the value of the inputs that are 
used to create the produced good and the value of the produced good 
itself—to the consumer, maximizing what is called “consumer 
surplus.”36 It does this by pushing prices down to the cost of 
production. Under conditions of what is called “perfect 
competition”—perfect competition being the ideal that the orthodox 
model of competition law seeks to produce37—producers can only 
secure customers by offering goods at their lowest possible price, and 
that price is the cost of securing the inputs necessary to produce the 
good. The value that is created by the actual production of the good 
therefore accrues to the more democratic consumer class, rather than 
to the—allegedly—more oligarchical producer class.38 
(Perfect) competition also promotes consumer sovereignty by 
promoting the economic efficiency of markets.39 This efficiency 
comes in two guises. One is “productive efficiency”—also referred to 
as “technical efficiency”—which refers to a market’s ability to 
maximize output from a given quantity of input.  In practical terms, 
this means producing goods at their lowest possible costs. The other is 
“allocative efficiency”—or “cost efficiency”—which refers to a 

35. Abba P. Lerner, The Economics and Politics of Consumer Sovereignty, 62 AM. 
ECON. REV. 258 (1972); see also Hutt, supra note 29, at 77 (describing consumer sovereignty 
as, “the free and effective expression of all human preferences in respect of ends which are 
confronted with scarce means”). See generally AMATO, supra note 33. 
36. Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of 
Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 71-77.  The idea of 
consumer surplus was first developed by Alfred Marshall. See ALFRED MARSHALL, 
PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 124-27 (C.W. Guillebaud ed., 9th ed. 1961).  
37. See George J. Stigler, Perfect Competition, Historically Contemplated, 65 J. POL. 
ECON. 1 (1957). See generally Jessop, supra note 19, at 99-103. The notion of perfect 
competition was first identified in 1836 by the English lawyer and economist, Nassau William 
Senior. See NASSAU WILLIAM SENIOR, AN OUTLINE OF SCIENCE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 
102 (Farrar & Rinehart, 1939) (1836).  
38. See also, e.g., LIPPMANN, supra note 34, at 54-55. 
39.  See  Rowe, supra note 28, at 1550-51. 
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market’s ability to allocate limited resources so as to maximize that 
market’s production of aggregate social wealth.40 Competition 
promotes productive efficiency by giving evolutionary advantage to 
firms who use resources most efficiently. More efficient use of 
resources results in lower production costs, which results in lower 
product prices, which results in more sales, which allows the producer 
to better survive in competition with less efficient competitors.41 
Competition promotes allocative efficiency by ensuring that more 
efficient users of particular resources will enjoy greater access to 
those resources due to the greater revenue stream these producers can 
generate from these resources via higher sales.42 By generating 
continual pressures to improve productive and allocative efficiency, 
perfect competition ensures that the economy over time will generate 
ever increasing quantities and diversities of the goods available to 
consumers, even given a fixed amount of resources.43  
Perfect competition is also sometimes said to promote dynamic 
efficiency, i.e., efficiency in responding to changes in the market 
environment.44 But this claim is controversial.45 

40. See Joseph F. Brodley, The Economic Goals of Antitrust: Efficiency, Consumer 
Welfare, and Technological Progress, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1020-21 (1987); see also PROSSER, 
supra note 24, at 19; cf. WALTER NICHOLSON & CHRISTOPHER M. SNYDE, MICROECONOMIC 
THEORY: BASIC PRINCIPLES AND EXTENSIONS 611-20 (11th ed. 2011) (on the importance of 
allocative efficiency and productive efficiency of economic theory).  
41. Brodley, supra note 40, at 1027 (importance of productive efficiency to competition 
law); see D. Bruce Johnsen, Wealth Is Value, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 263, 277 (1986); cf. Oliver E. 
Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 
18, 1968, at 21-32 (on the general importance of productive efficiency); see Rowe, supra note 
28, at 1549. 
42. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY WAR WITH 
ITSELF 90-106 (1993); GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 176-90 (4th ed. 1987); see 
also Brodley, supra note 40, at 1027 (as between the various kinds of efficiency, promoting 
allocative efficiency appears to be the principle goal of competition law). But see Johnsen, 
supra note 41, at 274, 277 (suggesting that allocative efficiency is only important to the extent 
it promotes productive efficiency); FREDERIC M. SCHERER & DAVID ROSS, INDUSTRIAL 
MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 460-71 (3d ed. 1990); Rowe, supra 
note 28, at 1549 (for a critique of allocative efficiency as a concept).   
43. See John J. Siegfried & Edwin H. Wheeler, Cost Efficiency and Monopoly Power: A 
Survey, 21 Q. REV. ECON. & BUS. 25 (1981). 
44. See, e.g., Michael E. Porter, Competition and Antitrust: Toward a Productivity-Based 
Approach to Evaluating Mergers and Joint Ventures, 46 ANTITRUST BULL. 919 (2001). For a 
discussion of dynamic efficiency, see Andrew B. Abel, N. Gregory Mankiw, Lawrence H. 
Summers & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Assessing Dynamic Efficiency: Theory and Evidence, 56 
REV. ECON. STUDIES 1 (1989). 
45. See Pankaj Ghemawat & Joan El Ricart Costa, The Organizational Tension between 
Static and Dynamic Efficiency, 14 STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT J. 59 (1993); see also infra notes 
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B. The Limits of the Orthodox Model 
The orthodox model derives from the experiences of the 
advanced industrial economies of the North Atlantic during the 
twentieth century.46 For this reason, embedded in this model are 
certain presumptions about the nature of a capitalist economy. These 
presumptions include: (1) that consumers are located in the same 
economy that produced the goods being consumed; (2) that the 
markets that drive that economy are best governed by price 
competition rather than by some other form of competition; (3) that 
the economy is relatively stable; (4) that the delivery of the goods and 
services associated with citizenship can be adequately provided for by 
the public tax system; and (5) that the economy is large enough to 
generate and maintain minimally efficient economies of scale. 
These presumptions that are for the most part unproblematic in 
the context of the North Atlantic’s modern experiences.  But as we 
shall see, they are by no means universal. In export-oriented 
economies, for example, consumers are not located in the same 
economy as producers. Even in North Atlantic economies, many 
industrial sectors compete on the basis of product design, i.e., what is 
called “product competition,” rather than on the basis of price. Many 
national economies, particularly those outside of the advanced 
industrial North Atlantic, suffer from significant and persistent 
volatility. Nor does competition law fit well with economies which 
are tasked with the distribution of public goods and/or services that 
are associated with citizenship. Finally, many national economies are 
too small to allow perfect competition to generate on its own the 
minimally efficient economies of scale necessary to compete in 
transnational, price-competitive markets. 
1. Export-Oriented47 and Other Forms of ‘Producerist’ Economies 
As described above, the orthodox model of competition law is 
consumerist in orientation—it works first and foremost to bring 

65-73 and accompanying text.  See generally MICHAEL J. PIORE & CHARLES F. SABEL, THE 
SECOND INDUSTRIAL DIVIDE: POSSIBILITIES FOR PROSPERITY 49-54 (1984). 
46. See GERBER, supra note 4, at viii; see also infra notes 106-19 and accompanying text.  
47. See infra note 50. I use “export-oriented” rather than the more common “export-
driven” in order to emphasize that export orientation is not always simply the product of a 
policy choice. Particularly insofar as more peripheral economies are concerned, export-
orientation can be a structural consequence of their Ricardian comparative advantage in lower 
production costs.   
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benefit to consumers, in the form of consumer sovereignty, consumer 
welfare, and consumer surplus.48 The rationale for this is that the 
consumer class is more democratic and broadly inclusive than are 
other economic classes—such as workers or industrialists—and thus 
an economic regime that promotes consumer welfare is the most 
democratic and egalitarian when compared to its alternatives.49  
This rationale assumes, however, that the consumers and 
producers are all part of the same economy. But this is not always the 
case. Many economies, particularly lesser developed economies, are 
export-oriented, in the sense that these economies sustain themselves 
by manufacturing goods that are then consumed by consumers in a 
different economy.50 Here, a competition regulatory regime that 
focuses on promoting consumer welfare and consumer surplus can be 
of lesser domestic benefit, since it would simply be exporting the 
wealth generated by domestic production to an outside economy.51 In 
export-oriented economies, an alternative, producerist-oriented 
competition regulatory framework can be of greater benefit, since it 
would allow more of the wealth—surplus value—generated by 
production to remain in domestic economy.52 

48. See supra notes 29-43 and accompanying text; see also James Q. Whitman, 
Consumerism Versus Producerism: A Study in Comparative Law, 117 YALE L.J. 340, 371-83 
(2007).  
49.  See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text. 
50. See JONATHAN V. LEVIN, THE EXPORT ECONOMICS: THEIR PATTERN OF 
DEVELOPMENT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (1960); cf. JOHANN HEINRICH VON THÜNEN, 
VON THUNEN’S ISOLATED STATE: AN ENGLISH EDITION OF DER ISOLIERTE STAAT (Peter Hall 
ed., Carla M. Watenberg trans., 1966) (1826); see also Herman Schwartz, Dependency or 
Institutions? Economic Geography, Casual Mechanisms, and Logic in the Understanding of 
Development, 42 STUD. COMP. INT’L DEV. 115, 125-28 (2007). 
51. See Whitman, supra note 48, at 371-83. See generally Michael W. Dowdle, 
Competition in the Periphery: Melamine Milk Adulteration as Peripheral ‘Innovation’, in 
ASIAN CAPITALISM AND THE REGULATION OF COMPETITION: TOWARDS A REGULATORY 
GEOGRAPHY OF GLOBAL COMPETITION LAW 119 (Michael W. Dowdle et al. eds., 2013); 
Jeffery Henderson, Global Production Networks, Competition, Regulation, and Poverty 
Reduction: Policy Implications, (U. of Manchester, Ctr. on Regulation and Competition, 
Working Paper No. 115, 2005).  
52.    See Sanford M. Jacoby, Finance and Labor: Perspectives on Risk, Inequality, and 
Democracy, 30 COMP. LABOR L. & POL’Y J. 17 (2008); cf. Mats Bergman, Antitrust, 
Marketing Cooperatives, and Market Power, 4 EUR. J. L. & ECON. 73 (1997); Aravind R. 
Ganesh, The Right to Food and Buyer Power, 11 GER. L.J. 1190 (2010); FREDERIC M. 
SCHERER, COMPETITION POLICY, DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL 395-403 (2000); Joseph E. 
Stiglitz, Some Lessons from the East Asian Miracle, 11 THE WORLD BANK RESEARCH 
OBSERVER, 151, 164-65 (1996) (discussing positive role that ‘recession cartels’ sometimes had 
in “enabl[ing] the industry in question to avoid the low prices that would damage all the firms” 
in East Asian economies). 
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2. Economies That Are Based on Product Competition Rather Than 
Price Competition 
The orthodox model promotes market competition based on 
price.53 But some important industrial sectors are not governed by 
price competition. Instead, their goods compete based on specifics of 
product design.54 This kind of competition is often referred to as 
“product competition” or “product differentiation.”55 A paradigmatic 
example of a product-competitive market is the consumer market for 
Hollywood films in the United States. Hollywood films do not 
generally compete on the basis of ticket price—the vast majority of 
local cinemas invariably price all movie tickets the same. Instead, 
people choose which movie to see based simply on the relative appeal 
of that movie vis-à-vis other available movies.56 
In fact, product competitiveness is often a more critical 
component of a country’s economic strength than price 
competitiveness per se.57 In fact, product competitiveness is often 
impeded by promoting price competitiveness.58 Success in product 

53. See David B Audretscha, William J Baumolb & Andrew E Burke, Competition Policy 
in Dynamic Markets, 19 INT’L J. INDUSTRIAL. ORG. 613, 616-19 (2001); see also Daniel J. 
Gifford & Robert T. Kudrle, European Union Competition Law and Policy: How Much 
Latitude for Convergence with the United States, 48 ANTITRUST BULL. 727, 735 (2003); supra 
notes 37-38 and accompanying text. 
54. Economies founded on this kind of market competition are sometimes referred to as 
“new economies,” or “knowledge-based” economies. See, e.g., COMPETITION, REGULATION 
AND THE NEW ECONOMY (Cosmo Graham & Fiona Smith eds., 2004); The Knowledge Based 
Economy, ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT [OECD] 
(OCDE/GD(96)102, 1996), available at http://www.oecd.org/sti/sci-tech/1913021.pdf. 
55. See, e.g, Robin Roy & Johann c.k.h. Riedel, Design and Innovation in Successful 
Product Competition, 17 TECHNOVATION 537 (1997). For the germinal explication of product 
competition (what he called “product differentiation”), see EDWARD HASTINGS CHAMBERLIN, 
THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION: A RE-ORIENTATION OF THE THEORY OF 
VALUE (Harvard University Press, 8th ed. 1965) (1933). See generally R. Rothschild, The 
Theory of Monopolistic Competition: E.H. Chamberlin's Influence on Industrial Organisation 
Theory over Sixty Years, 14 J. ECON. STUD. 34 (1987).  
56. See Paul DiMaggio, Market Structure, the Creative Process and Pop Culture, 11 J. 
POPULAR CULTURE 436, 444 (1997). For another example of a product-competitive market, 
see C. Storey & C. Easingwood, Determinants of New Product Performance, A Study in the 
Financial Services Sector, 7 INT’L J. SERV. INDUS. MGMT. 32 (1996) (product competition in 
financial services industry). 
57. See infra notes 360-61 and accompanying text. 
58. See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 82-85 (3d 
ed. 1975); see also James Crotty, Core Industries, Coercive Competition and the Structural 
Contradiction of Global Neoliberalism, in THE NEW COMPETITION FOR INWARD 
INVESTMENT: COMPANIES, INSTITUTIONS AND TERRITORIAL DEVELOPMENT 9 (Nicholas 
Phelps & Philip Raines eds., 2003); David B. Audretsch, William J. Baumol & Andrew E. 
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design development often depends upon a firm’s embeddedness 
within wide networks of industrial cooperation among formally 
competing firms,59 a type of “competition” that Joseph Schumpeter 
famously termed “co-respective” competition.60 This type of 
competition is seen as being in tension with the “perfect competition” 
promoted by the orthodox model,61 and a competition regulatory 
regime that focuses on promoting price competition is thus often ill-
suited for these kinds of industries.62 
3. Volatile Economies 
Another often overlooked limitation of the orthodox model lies 
in its presumption that the economic environment is generally 

Burke, Competition Policy in Dynamic Markets, 19 INT’L J. INDUST. ORG. 613 (2001); Charlie 
Karlsson & Jan Larsson, Product and Price Competition in a Regional Context, 69 PAPERS IN 
REGIONAL SCIENCE 83 (1990). 
59. See, e.g., MICHAEL STORPER, THE REGIONAL WORLD: TERRITORIAL DEVELOPMENT 
IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 5, 28 (1997); Anthony J. Venables, Shifts in Economic Geography 
and Their Causes, at 7 (The London Sch. of Econ. Ctr. for Econ. Performance, CEP 
Discussion Paper No. 767, 2006); see also Frederic C. Deyo, Addressing the Development 
Deficit of Competition Policy: The Role of Economic Networks, in ASIAN CAPITALISM AND 
THE REGULATION OF COMPETITION: TOWARDS A REGULATORY GEOGRAPHY OF GLOBAL 
COMPETITION LAW 283 (Michael W. Dowdle et al. eds., 2013).  
60. See SCHUMPETER, supra note 58, at 84-85; see also infra note 361 and 
accompanying text. 
61. See KATARZYNA CZAPRACKA, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF 
ANTITRUST: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF US AND EU APPROACHES 36-91 (2009); cf. William 
E. Kovacic, A Regulator’s Perspective on Getting the Balance Right, in INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY, COMPETITION LAW AND ECONOMICS IN ASIA 23 (R. Ian McEwin ed., 2011). See 
generally INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, COMPETITION LAW AND ECONOMICS IN ASIA (R. Ian 
McEwin ed., 2011). 
62. See James Crotty, Slow Growth, Destructive Competition, and Low Road Labor 
Relations: A Keynes-Marx-Schumpeter Analysis of Neoliberal Globalization, at 13 (Univ. of 
Mass. Amherst, Political Econ. Research Inst. (PERI) Working Paper No. 6, 2000), available 
at http://www.peri.umass.edu/fileadmin/pdf/working_papers/working_papers_1-50/WP6.pdf; 
see also Charles F. Sabel, Learning by Monitoring: The Institutions of Economic Development, 
in THE HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY 137 (Neil Smelser & Richard Swedberg eds., 
1st ed. 1994); DeLong & Summers, supra note 1, at 34; J. Gregory Sidak & David Teece, 
Favouring Dynamic Competition over Static Competition in Antitrust Law, in INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY, COMPETITION LAW AND ECONOMICS IN ASIA 53 (R. Ian McEwin ed., 2011); Peter 
Møllgaard & Jo Lorentzen, Competition Policy and Innovation, in INTERNATIONAL 
HANDBOOK ON INDUSTRIAL POLICY 115 (Patrizio Bianchi & Sandrine Labory eds., 2006); 
Rowe, supra note 28, at 1553-59; Brodley, supra note 40, at 1026; SCHUMPETER, supra note 
58, at 82-85. For an econometric explication, see K. Sridhar Moorthy, Product and Price 
Competition in a Duopoly, 7 MARKETING SCIENCE 141 (1988).      
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stable.63 Many economies, particularly those of less developed 
countries,64 feature considerable volatility. (In fact, there is good 
evidence that economic stability is increasingly the exception rather 
than the rule throughout most of the world.65)  
For economies that are subject to significant volatility, 
regulatory regimes that focus on promoting price competition can 
work to further catalyze that volatility. Recall that price competition 
pushes prices down to the cost of production.66 This forces producers 
to operate at razor-thin profit margins. So long as an economy is 
relative stable, as has been the case with American capitalism in 
particular for most of the twentieth century, this is not so 
problematic.67 But these razor-thin profit margins can also render 
producers, and even whole industries, vulnerable to economic 
disruption.68 Small profit margins impede a firm’s ability to maintain 

63. See PIORE & SABEL, supra note 45, at 49-54 (noting this as a general presumption of 
American economic regulation during the long Twentieth Century); see also Arthur F. Burns, 
Progress Towards Economic Stability, 50 AM. ECON. REV. 1 (1960). 
64. See Eswar S. Prasad, Kenneth Rogoff, Shang-Jin Wei & M. Ayhan Kose, Effects of 
Financial Globalization on Developing Countries: Some Empirical Evidence, at 18-28 
(International Monetary Fund, Occasional Paper No. 220, 2003); see also ABHIJIT V. 
BANERJEE & ESTHER DUFLO, POOR ECONOMICS: BAREFOOT HEDGE-FUND MANAGERS, DIY 
DOCTORS AND THE SURPRISING TRUTH ABOUT LIFE ON LESS THAN $1 A DAY 133-55 (2011). 
65. Id. at 279-80; see also Stephen Gill, Economic Globalization and the 
Internationalization of Authority: Limits and Contradictions, 23 GEOFORUM 269 (1992); 
Adam Tickell & Jamie A. Peck, Social Regulation after Fordism: Regulation Theory, Neo-
liberalism and the Global-Local Nexus, 24 ECON. & SOC. 357 (1995); DeLong & Summers, 
supra note 1. 
66. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text. 
67. See PIORE & SABEL, supra note 45, at 49-54. 
68. See Paul J. Irvine & Jeffrey Pontiff, Idiosyncratic Return Volatility, Cash Flows, and 
Product Market Competition, 22 REV. FIN. STUDIES 1149, 1150 (2009): 
The mosaic of evidence suggests that the recent upward trend in idiosyncratic 
volatility is related to an increasingly competitive environment in which firms 
have less market power. When the success of one firm in an industry comes at 
the expense of another firm in that industry, competition contributes to 
negative covariance in firm performance. In general, markets reflect an 
environment with less consumer loyalty to a specific firm, perhaps due to 
better access to information or the reduction of other search costs. Our results 
coincide with the findings of economics research that indicates increased 
competition in the US economy.This is a particular manifestation of the larger 
market problem known as “destructive competition.” 
See also MANAGING ECONOMIC VOLATILITY AND CRISES: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE 
(Joshua Aizenman & Brian Pinto eds., 2005); Joseph E. Stiglitz, Some Lessons from the East 
Asian Miracle, 11 THE WORLD BANK RESEARCH OBSERVER 151, 164-65 (1996); Steven C. 
Salop & David T. Scheffman, Raising Rivals’ Costs, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 267 (1983); 
WILLIAM J. BAUMOL ET AL., CONTESTABLE MARKETS AND THE THEORY OF INDUSTRY 
STRUCTURE (1982); see, e.g., Andrew R. Goetz & Timothy M. Vowles, The Good, the Bad, 
318 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 38:301 
the wealth reserves that would allow it to weather, for example, a 
sudden tightening of credit,69 a sudden decrease in consumer spending 
power,70 or the sudden appearance of a new technology in a 
competing firm.71 Price competitive markets cause periods of 
economic volatility to result in high firm turnover. High firm 
turnover, for its part, creates employment instability. And all of this 
feeds back to further catalyze the economic volatility.72 Even during 
periods of relative stability, a regulatory focus on price competition 
can be problematic in innately volatile environments. Because the 
long-term prospects of firms in such environments are considerably 
less sure, these firms tend to take a short-term business focus and are 
discouraged from engaging in innovation and upgrading.73 
4. Economies that Involve Distributional Justice. 
The orthodox model for competition regulation is hostile to 
subjecting competition law to concerns about distributional justice. 
Competition law, as we have seen, focuses on promoting the 
efficiency of markets.74 Distributional justice, by contrast, is 
concerned with issues of equality of distribution. Pursuit of efficiency 
is generally seen as being structurally incompatible with pursuit of 
equality of distribution.75 For this reason, the orthodox model is 
sometimes said to hold that competition law should not be concerned 

and the Ugly: 30 Years of US Airline Deregulation, 17 J. TRANSP. GEO. 251 (2009) (showing 
how increased price competition has contributed to industrial volatility in the American airline 
industry). 
69. See Gordon L. Clark, Money Flows like Mercury: The Geography of Global Finance, 
87 GEOGRAFISKA ANNALER: SERIES B, HUMAN GEOGRAPHY 99 (2005); see, e.g., PASUK 
PHONGPAICHIT & CHRIS BAKER, THAILAND’S CRISIS (2000). 
70.  See Joseph Stiglitz, The Private Uses of Public Interests: Incentives and Institutions, 
12 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 3, 12-13 (1998). 
71. Crotty, supra note 58, at 17-18; Giorgio Monti, Article 82 EC and New Economy 
Markets, in COMPETITION, REGULATION AND THE NEW ECONOMY 17, 22-23 (Cosmo Graham 
& Fiona Smith eds., 2004), at 22-23; see also Philip A. Anderson & Michael L. Tushman, 
Managing Through Cycles of Technological Change, 34 RESEARCH TECHNOLOGY MGMT. 26 
(1991). 
72. See Thomas Laursen & Sandeep Mahajan, Volatility, Income Distribution, and 
Poverty, in MANAGING ECONOMIC VOLATILITY AND CRISES: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE 101 
(Joshua Aizenman & Brian Pinto eds., 2005).  
73. Crotty, supra note 58, at 18. 
74. See supra notes 36-43 and accompanying text. 
75. See ARTHUR OKUN, EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY: THE BIG TRADEOFF (1975). 
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with issues of “fairness.”76 Rather, such issues should be addressed 
separately, through the tax system. This allows market to focus on 
what they do best—maximizing wealth. This in turn produces greater 
aggregate wealth for society, which after being redistributed via the 
tax system, results in more personal wealth for each member of that 
society than would be the case if markets were tasked with insuring 
some equality of distribution by themselves.77 
However, there are a number of problems with this model. The 
first and most obvious is that it is simply not at all reflective of actual 
practice. Competition law regimes everywhere recognize that 
sometimes distributional concerns are best addressed directly through 
market regulation—including competition regulation—rather than 
indirectly through the tax system. Perhaps the most obvious example 
of this involves the labor market. In all developed economies, labor is 
allocated primarily via private markets. But these markets are 
invariably subject to significant distributional regulation.78 This is 
because every modern political system regards access to some form of 
living-wage employment as something that should be enjoyed by all 
its citizens, even at a possible cost to productive and allocative 
efficiency.79 But at the same time, our understanding of the logic of 
capitalism also tells us that employment is best allocated by markets 
rather than by administrative fiat.80 The orthodox model handles this 
apparent contradiction by exempting some aspects of the labor 
market, but not others, from the purview of competition law.81  
Nor are labor markets the only markets whose regulation takes 
into account distributional considerations. European competition law 
carves out a similar exemption for firms that engage in what are 

76. See supra note 373 and accompanying text (discussing orthodox model’s antipathy 
toward fairness). 
77. See generally Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness versus Welfare, 114 HARV. 
L. REV. 961 (2001). 
78. See John A. Litwinski, Regulation of Labor Market Monopsony, 22 BERKELEY J. 
EMP. & LAB. L. 49 (2001). 
79. Id; see also Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 23(1), G.A. Res. 217A, at 
72, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. Mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948); International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 6, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 
(entered into force Jan. 3, 1976). 
80. See Xavier Sala-i-Martín et al., The Global Competitiveness Index 2013–2014: 
Sustaining Growth, Building Resilience, in THE GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 2013-
2014: FULL DATA EDITION 3, 5-6 (2013). 
81. Litwinski, supra note 78. 
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termed “services of general economic interest.”82 Like labor, these are 
services that are regarded as being best allocated principally through 
private markets, but which nevertheless are seen as raising significant 
distributional concerns. Examples include health care, transportation, 
and telecommunications.83 
Another problem with locating issues of distribution solely in the 
tax system is that this ignores the fact that tax-and-redistribution 
systems have their own unique set of costs.84 These include, in 
particular, their administrative costs. Not only are these costs often 
not insignificant,85 but they can differ from economy to economy. For 
example, economies populated by larger numbers of smaller firms 
have higher tax collection costs than economies in which wealth is 
concentrated in fewer but larger firms.86 Taxation and redistribution 
are also significantly more expensive to administer in cash-based 
economies than in credit-based economies, due to the greater 
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82. See Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, art. 106 (3), 
[1997] OJ C 340/1; see also Treaty of Lisbon, Protocol on Services of General Interest, [2007] 
OJ C 306/158.  
83. See generally PROSSER, supra note 24. See also Dragana Damjanovic & Bruno de 
Witte, Welfare Integration through EU Law: The Overall Picture in the Light of the Lisbon 
Treaty, in INTEGRATING WELFARE FUNCTIONS INTO EU LAW—FROM ROME TO LISBON, 53 
(Ulla Neergaard et al. eds., 2009); Prosser, supra note 9, at 232-37. These special distributional 
concerns are captured in EU law in the notion of “social solidarity.” See Sodemare and Others 
v. Regione Lombardia, [1997] ECR I-3395, AG’s Opinion para. 29. See generally Kathleen 
Thelen, Economic Regulation and Social Solidarity: Conceptual and Analytic Innovations in 
the Study of Advanced Capitalism, 8 SOCIO-ECONOMIC REV. 187 (2010); Tony Prosser, 
Regulation and Social Solidarity, 33 J. L. & SOC. 364 (2006); Tamara Hervey, ‘Social 
Solidarity: A Buttress against Internal Market Law?’, in SOCIAL LAW AND POLICY IN AN 
EVOLVING EUROPEAN UNION 31 (Jo Shaw ed., 2000). See also THE CHANGING  LEGAL 
FRAMEWORK FOR SERVICES OF GENERAL INTEREST IN EUROPE: BETWEEN COMPETITION AND 
SOLIDARITY (Markus Krajewski, Ulla Neergaard, & Johan van de Gronden eds., 2009).  
84. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient than the 
Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 22 J. LEG. STUDIES 667 (1994). Kaplow and Shavell 
have recognized that inefficiencies in the tax system could compromise their model, but so far 
have only considered these “inefficiencies” only in the context of taxation’s disincentivizing of 
work, not in the context of administrative costs. Id. 
85. See, e.g., Joel Slemrod, Optimal Taxation and Optimal Tax Systems, 4 J. ECON. 
PERSPECTIVES 157 (1990) (discussing the need to take administrative costs into account in 
designing optimal tax systems). 
86. See Richard M. Bird & Eric M. Zolt, Redistribution via Taxation: The Limited Role 
of the Personal income Tax in Developing Countries, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1627, 1665 (2005); 
see also A. Pınar Yeúin, Tax Collection Costs, Tax Evasion and Optimal Interest Rates (Study 
Center Gerzensee Working Paper No. 04.02, April 2004), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=929715. 
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difficulties involved in administrative monitoring of cash 
transactions.87 
Obviously, if the administrative costs of a tax and redistribution 
scheme are too great, then they can offset the gains in wealth 
generation realized by allowing markets unfettered pursuit of 
efficiency. In such a case, it can be more efficient overall to affect the 
desired distribution directly through market regulation. This is 
particularly likely to be the case with lesser-industrialized countries,88 
since both larger sized firms and credit-based economies tend to be 
the product of significant industrial development.89 
By treating issues of distribution as simply exceptions rather 
than as affirmative regulatory concerns in their own right, the 
orthodox model of competition law also invisibilizes the question of 
how to determining when particular private-market goods deserve 
distributional considerations. Again, this is not so much of a problem 
in the case of the advanced industrial economies of the North 
Atlantic.  Today, the exceptions that they designate simply seem 
natural given North Atlantic Fordism’s century-long period of 
systemic stability. It becomes much more of a problem, however, 
when that model is applied to economies outside the North Atlantic.  
The kinds of goods and services that need to be subject to 
distributional concerns will differ from economy to economy. 
Consider, for example, the case of what might be called “citizenship 
goods.”90 These are goods and services that the state provides its 
citizenry in exchange for their loyalty—a kind of loyalty that T.H. 
Marshall famously termed “social citizenship.”91 Obvious examples 
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87. See Ilan Benshalom, Taxing Cash, 4 COLUM. J. TAX L. 65 (2012); see also John L. 
Douglas, The Role of a Banking System in Nation-Building, 60 MAINE L. REV. 511 (2008). 
The “credit economy” (kreditwirthschaft) as an industrialization-driven successor to the cash-
based economy was first identified by Bruno Hildebrand. See Bruno Hildebrand, 
Naturalwirtschaft, Geldwirtschaft und Kreditwirtschaft, in 2 JAHRBÜCHER FÜR 
NATIONALÖKONOMIE UND STATISTIK 1, 3-4 (1864). 
88. See JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 119-20 (2002).  
89. See Norman Gemmell & Oliver Morrissey, Distribution and Poverty Impact of Tax 
Structure Reform in Developing Countries: How Little We Know, 23 DEV. POLICY REV. 131 
(2005); Bird & Zolt, supra note 86, at 1666; cf. M. Kabir Hassan, Benito Sanchez & Jung-Suk 
Yu, Financial Development and Economic Growth: New Evidence from Panel Data, 51 Q. 
REV. ECON. & FIN. 88 (2011). 
90. Cf. PROSSER, supra note 24, 35-38 (discussing what he terms “citizenship rights”). 
91. This kind of exchange—goods and services for legitimacy—was famously captured 
by T.H. Marshall in his notion of “social citizenship.” See generally T.H. MARSHALL, 
CITIZENSHIP AND SOCIAL CLASS, AND OTHER ESSAYS (1950). See also Desmond S. King & 
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in the North Atlantic would include health care (although perhaps not 
in the United States), access to employment providing a living wage, 
and public education and other resources necessary to provide 
equality of opportunity.92 Since we are all equal as citizens, we all 
have an equal claim to these kinds of goods independent of our 
individual capacity to pay and independent of whatever personal 
productive efficiencies that capacity might signify. Citizenship goods 
must therefore be distributed on the basis of equality and fairness 
rather than simply on the basis of productive and allocative 
efficiency.93 
But different polities often have different understandings of 
which goods and services should be treated as citizenship goods. 
Studies show, for example, that polities of more peripheral, 
underdeveloped countries tend to regard as citizenship goods those 
goods and services that provide material security and stability. These 
include things such as job security, food and water, gasoline and 
electricity, and a living wage. Citizens in more wealthy industrialized 
countries, by contrast, tend to regard as citizenship goods those goods 
and services that provide opportunity for self-realization:  goods such 
as education and equal job opportunity, reflecting the greater material 
security that advanced industrial economies naturally afford their 
citizenry.94 Because the orthodox theory does not theorize the 
particular circumstances under which a particular good should be 
considered a citizenship good, it cannot, particularly in the context of 
socio-economic conditions that differ from those that tacitly inform 
the model, distinguish a good or service that has been partial 
exempted from competition law because it represents a citizenship 
good from a good or service that has been partially exempted simply 

Jeremy Waldron, Citizenship, Social Citizenship and the Defence of Welfare Provision, 18 
BRITISH J. POL. SCI. 415 (1988). 
92. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 23(1), G.A. Res. 217A, at 72, 
U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. Mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948); International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 6, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 
(entered into force Jan. 3, 1976). 
93. See also OKUN, supra note 75. 
94. See Ronald Inglehart, Post-Materialism in an Environment of Insecurity, 74 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 880 (1981); Ronald Inglehart & Daphna Oyserman, Individualism, Autonomy 
and Self-Expression: The Human Development Syndrome, in COMPARING CULTURES, 
DIMENSIONS OF CULTURE IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 74 (Henk Vinken et al. eds.,  
2004); cf. BANERJEE & DUFLO, supra note 64. See generally RONALD INGLEHART, 
MODERNIZATION AND POSTMODERNIZATION: CULTURAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL 
CHANGE IN 43 SOCIETIES (1997).  
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due to the self-serving political machinations of some powerful 
special interest. 
A good example of this is found in the intense and sometimes 
violent public opposition to World Bank and International Monetary 
Fund (“IMF”) efforts during the 1980s and 1990s to compel 
underdeveloped nations to subject food, fuel, and water to private 
market competition, in order to promote greater productive 
efficiencies in these sectors.95 The World Bank and IMF were unable 
to appreciate the symbolic, social citizenship values enjoyed by these 
particular goods and services.96 For populations that had long suffered 
from chronic lack of economic and material security, a state guarantee 
that they would always have relatively secure access to these essential 
goods and services despite inevitably volatilities in their personal or 
local economic circumstances could be a critical source of existential 
comfort.97 Under such circumstances, a policy decision to begin 
distributing such goods in accordance with principles of market 
competition would be killing the patient in order to save him. 
Finally, we might also note that the orthodox demand to 
maintain strict segregation between markets and public law concerns 
appears to be on the wrong side of history. Over the last couple of 
decades, the regulatory trend has been towards greater intermingling 
of public goals with private markets.98 Examples include the 
increasing use of privatization99 and public-private partnerships,100 
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95. See Raj Patel & Philip McMichael, A Political Economy of the Food Riot, 12 
REVIEW, A JOURNAL OF THE FERNAND BRAUDEL CENTER 9 (2010); see also JOHN K. 
WALTON & DAVID SEDDON, FREE MARKETS AND FOOD RIOTS: THE POLITICS OF GLOBAL 
ADJUSTMENT (1994); Bronwen Morgan, Technocratic v. Convivial Accountability, in PUBLIC 
ACCOUNTABILITY: DESIGNS, DILEMMAS AND EXPERIENCES 243 (Michael W. Dowdle ed., 
2006). 
96. See STIGLITZ, supra note 88, at 119-20; see also Joseph Stiglitz, Financial Market 
Stability and Monetary Policy, 7 PAC. ECON. REV. 13, 20-21 (2002). 
97. See Patel & McMichael, supra note 95, at 14, 29; WALTON & SEDDON, supra note 
95; Morgan, supra note 95; see also ANNETTE AURELIE DESMARAIS, LA VÍA CAMPESINA: 
GLOBALIZATION AND THE POWER OF PEASANTS (2007); cf. Amartya Sen, Ingredients of 
Famine Analysis: Availability and Entitlements, 96 Q. J. ECON. 433, 434-39 (1981) (showing 
how material vulnerability is more a product of distribution of entitlements than of material 
scarcity per se).   
98. See also PROSSER, supra note 24, at 20-28; Jody Freeman, Extending Public 
Accountability through Privatization: From Public Law to Publicization, in PUBLIC 
ACCOUNTABILITY: DESIGN, DILEMMAS AND EXPERIENCES 83 (Michael W. Dowdle ed., 
2006). 
99. See Freeman, supra note 98. On the rise of privatization, see WILLIAM L. 
MEGGINSON, THE FINANCIAL ECONOMICS OF PRIVATIZATION 14-21 (2004). 
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both of which look to combine, in increasingly novel ways, public 
services with market modes of delivery. The orthodox model’s 
difficulties in coming to grips with these new developments, even 
within the context of the core economies of the North Atlantic, have 
been well described.101 
5. “Small” Economies 
The orthodox model of competition also poses problems for 
what Michel Gal has recently termed “small economies”—economies 
that are too small to achieve minimum efficient scales of production 
(“MES”).102 The lure of industrialized production lies in its inverse 
relationship between production quantity and product costs: the more 
units a firm produces, the less each unit costs to produce. But 
obviously, this also means that the fewer units a firm produces, the 
more it costs to produce each unit. As we proceed along this 
backwards trajectory, cost of production becomes increasingly 
inefficient, and at some point the small producer cannot compete in 
markets populated by larger producers. This point is referred to as the 
minimum efficient scale of production. In other words, MES tells us 
the number of units that a firm in an industrialized economy needs to 
produce in order to be economically sustainable.103  
The fact that firms need to produce at some minimum level of 
scale in order to be sustainable poses particular problems for “small 
economies”—“small” in this sense referring to national population 
rather than gross domestic product (“GDP”). The smaller the 
economy, the greater its difficulty in supporting multiple firms of 
efficient MES. In many cases, a domestic economy can only support 
one or two firms operating at MES levels of product.104 In such 
economies, competition law’s concern with preventing domestic 
market concentration can cause it to discourage if not prohibit the 
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100. See THE ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP (Darrin Grimsey & 
Mervyn K. Lewis eds., 2005); PUBLIC-PRIVATE POLICY PARTNERSHIPS (Pauline Vaillancourt 
Rosenau ed., 2000). 
101. For an analysis of the competition law problems raised by privatization, see 
generally PROSSER, supra note 24, at 20-38. For an analysis of conceptual problems raised by 
public-private partnerships, see Deyo, supra note 59, at 299-300.  
102. See generally MICHAL S. GAL, COMPETITION POLICY FOR SMALL MARKET 
ECONOMIES (2003). 
103. See generally id. at 13-45. 
104. See, e.g., id. at 19 
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emergence of MES-level firms, and thus can end up inhibiting that 
market’s overall productive efficiency.105 
C. The Orthodox Model and Fordism 
The limited reach of the orthodox model derives from the fact 
that that model presumes a particular kind of capitalist-industrial 
organization that is sometimes referred to as “Fordism”—or what 
Alfred Chandler has called “managerial capitalism”.106 The North 
Atlantic economies that gave rise to the orthodox model, and that 
continue to serve as its dominant reference, were and for the most part 
still are Fordist economies. Fordism grew out of the discovery in the 
late nineteenth century of how to effectively exploit, via mass 
production, economies of scale.107 This involved implementing a 
particular set of production technologies including task specialization, 
task standardization, and task routinization,—often collectively 
referred to as “scientific management”108—that allowed firms to 
lower the cost-per-unit of production by increasing the number of 
units produced.109 
Fordism imparted particular structural features to capitalist 
economies that have been critical to the effectiveness of the orthodox 
model. First, it promoted low-cost, high-volume production.  This 
made price competition the predominant focus of industrial 
competition. Fordism’s emphasis on large-scale mass production 
encourages consumerism, in order to promote the ever expanding 
consumer base that is necessary to generate more efficient and 
profitable scales of production. Particularly during its earlier stages, 
Fordism’s ability to continually expand into a seemingly 
inexhaustible consumer market rendered concern over achieving 
minimum efficient economies of scale—as per the small economy 
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105. See id. at 44-45. 
106. See BOB JESSOP & NGAI-LING SUM, BEYOND THE REGULATION APPROACH: 
PUTTING CAPITALIST ECONOMIES IN THEIR PLACE 58-68 (2006); see also PIORE & SABEL, 
supra note 45, at 21-26; Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., The Emergence of Managerial Capitalism, 58 
BUS. HIST. REV. 473 (1984); ALFRED D. CHANDLER JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE 
MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS (1977). 
107. See CHANDLER, supra note 106, at 479-87. 
108. See ROBERT KANIGEL, THE ONE BEST WAY: FREDERICK WINSLOW TAYLOR AND 
THE ENIGMA OF EFFICIENCY 9 (1997). 
109.  See PIORE & SABEL, supra note 45, at 52-54.  
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problem—unnecessary.110 Fordism’s emphasis on expanding the 
consumer base also both integrated and standardized national 
markets,111 making them amenable to national-level regulation using 
positivist law.112 Fordism also produced markets of exceptional 
stability, thus alleviating the need for more flexible and responsive 
production processes, and thereby allowing producers to focus 
primarily on lowering production costs.113 This stability also 
promoted the market’s ability to provide essential material necessities 
to the citizenry,114 and thus shifted the focus of citizenship goods 
from equitable access to essential material concerns to equitable 
access to meaningful lifestyle options.115 
Fordism emerged in the North Atlantic economies in the latter 
part of the nineteenth century. This was also the same time that the 
modern, neoclassical economic thought came to be theorized.116 The 
longevity of Fordism’s organizing force, together with the fact that 
present-day economic theorizing has had little direct experience with 
non-Fordist forms of capitalism, causes Fordism to appear to many to 
be a natural part of market capitalism per se. This may be why the 
limitations explored above are so under-recognized. But in fact, 
neither Fordism nor the features it brings to capitalist economies are 
inevitable or eternal. As will be explored further below, there is 
significant evidence that like the older capitalist orderings that it 
succeeded—England’s factory system117 and American craft 
production118 of the nineteenth century—Fordism too is now 
succumbing to post-Fordism, and its particular ordering effects on the 
socio-economic space are becoming undone.119  
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110. See ROBERT B. REICH, THE WORK OF NATIONS: PREPARING OURSELVES FOR 21ST 
CENTURY CAPITALISM 45 (1992); see also PIORE & SABEL, supra note 45, at 61-63. 
111. FERNAND BRAUDEL, CIVILIZATION AND CAPITALISM, 15TH-18TH CENTURY, Vol. 
3, THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE WORLD 287-89, 365-68 (Siân Reynolds trans., 1992); PIORE & 
SABEL, supra note 45, at 49-54. 
112. See also Michael W. Dowdle, Public Accountability in Alien Terrain: Exploring for 
Constitutional Accountability in the People’s Republic of China, in PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY: 
DESIGNS, DILEMMAS AND EXPERIENCES 329, 332-41 (Michael W. Dowdle ed., 2006). 
113.  PIORE & SABEL, supra note 45, at 73-104; see also BRAUDEL, supra note 111, at 
590. 
114. BRAUDEL, supra note 111, at 617. 
115. Inglehart, Post-materialism, supra note 94, at 881-82. 
116. See Tony Aspromourgos, On the Origins of the Term ‘Neoclassical’, 10 CAMB. J. 
ECON. 265, 265-66 (1986). 
117. See BRAUDEL, supra note 111, at 132. 
118. See PIORE & SABEL, supra note 45, at 5-6, 19-21. 
119. See infra note 371 and accompanying text. 
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D. Conclusion: Competition Law vs. Competition Regulation 
In the countries of the North Atlantic, many of the “limitations” 
of the orthodox model are addressed in legal doctrine other than 
competition law—intellectual property, for example, in the case of 
product-competitive markets and industries;120 or public utilities law 
in the case of certain kinds of citizenship goods.121 In this sense, in 
thinking about how North Atlantic capitalisms actually structure 
market competition, it is more accurate to think of this structuring in 
terms of a “regulatory system” rather than simply in terms of some 
formalist, doctrinally-delimited law. This allows us to see that despite 
its name, competition law is not the only law regulating market 
competition.  Even in North Atlantic economies, market competition 
is regulated by a diversity of regulatory orders: some formal, such as 
competition law, intellectual property law, public services law; and 
some informal, such as industrial practices122 or economic 
nationalism.123 Following Hugh Collins,124 this Article will refer to 
this more inclusive ordering of market competition as competition 
regulation, to distinguish it from the positivist and formal doctrinal 
law of competition law.125 And as we shall see, it is through the lens 
of competition regulation, rather than through that of the much more 
arbitrarily, doctrinally delineated lens of competition law, that 
comparisons between Fordism and non-Fordist competition law 
regimes become economically and socially meaningful. 

120. See CZAPRACKA, supra note 61; Kovacic, supra note 61. 
121. See, e.g., William T. Reisinger, Public Utilities Law, 49 U. RICH. L. REV. 137 
(2014); COSMO GRAHAM, REGULATING PUBLIC UTILITIES: A CONSTITUTIONAL APPROACH 
(2000). 
122. An example of this in European law is found in the doctrine of ‘good faith.’ See 
Gunther Teubner, Legal Irritants: How Unifying Law Ends up in New Divergences, 61 MOD. 
L. REV. 11 (1998). 
123. See Eric Helleiner, Economic Nationalism as a Challenge to Economic Liberalism?  
Lessons from the 19th Century, 46 INT’L STUD. Q. 307 (2002). 
124. See HUGH COLLINS, REGULATING CONTRACTS (2002); see also REGULATING LAW 
(Christine Parker, Colin Scott, Nicola Lacey & John Braithwaite eds., 2004). 
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II. FROM FORDISM TO “POST-FORDISM”: IDENTIFYING 
“ASIAN CAPITALISM” 
We noted above how the orthodox model presumes a Fordist 
economic system. But both the geographical and temporal reach of 
Fordism is limited, and there is significant evidence that Fordism is 
increasingly succumbing to post-Fordism, and its particular ordering 
effects on socio-economic space are becoming undone.126 Perhaps 
nowhere has post-Fordism so penetrated socio-economic space than 
in the économie-monde of East and Southeast Asia127—an economy 
that is often characterized as evincing “Asian capitalism.”128 It is to 
this economy that we now turn. 
A. The Asian Économie-Monde 
 “Asian capitalism” is the form of capitalism that is associated 
primarily with the countries of East and Southeast Asia (“ESE 
Asia”)—a region roughly coterminous with the ‘ASEAN+3’ 
countries.129 While consisting of a wide diversity of languages and 
cultures, it is a region that nevertheless evinces a high degree of 
internal economic interdependence and ordering, sufficient to 
delineate it as a distinct, coherent and somewhat autonomous 
economic space within the larger, global economy.130 
In this way, the regional economy of ESE Asia conforms to what 
Fernand Braudel famously termed an économie-monde.131 An 
économie-monde is a transnational but nevertheless spatially 
delineated form of economic ordering that is organized and given 
coherence by some distinctive high-end capitalist technology.  It is 
this technology that that binds the region together into coherent 
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126. See infra note 371 and accompanying text. 
127. See infra notes 158-73 and accompanying text. 
128. See generally infra notes 156-244 and accompanying text. 
129. ‘ASEAN’ is an acronym for ‘Association of Southeast Asian Nations’.  The 
ASEAN+3 countries are Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Brunei, Myanmar, Laos, 
Cambodia, Vietnam, the Philippines, South Korea, Japan, and the People’s Republic of China.  
130. See Heribert Dieter, Trade Integration in Asia, in THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF 
ASIAN REGIONALISM 116 (Mark Beeson & Richard Stubbs eds., 2012); cf. Jean-Pierre 
Allegreta & Essahbi Essaadi, Business Cycles Synchronization in East Asian Economy: 
Evidences from Time-Varying Coherence Study, in 28 ECONOMIC MODELLING 351 (2011) 
(finding significance coherence in business cycles across ESE Asia). 
131. BRAUDEL, supra note 111, at 21-22; see also A. J. SCOTT, REGIONS AND THE 
WORLD ECONOMY: THE COMING SHAPE OF GLOBAL PRODUCTION, COMPETITION, AND 
POLITICAL ORDER 75-100 (2001). 
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economic space, via the structuring of reciprocal comparative 
advantages through which different locales contribute different 
economic functionalities to the larger, regional economic order.132  
A distinguishing feature of an économie-monde is its “core-
periphery” spatial structure.133 In such a structure, higher value-added 
forms of production tend to concentrate in a relatively small 
geographic area of high wealth and highly advanced economic 
development called the “core”. The further one moves away from this 
core, into what is called the “periphery”, the less advanced and less 
wealthy the local economy. This results in a special arrangement in 
which a centralized, advanced economic core is surrounded by 
concentric rings of increasingly less-advanced economic activity.134 
These rings are often referred to as “Thünen rings”—or sometimes 
“Von Thünen rings”—after Johann Heinrich von Thünen, who first 
identified and explained this particular pattern of industrial 
distribution in the early nineteenth century.135 
(For example, in Europe in during the fourteenth and fifteenth 
centuries, Venice was the economic core and its regionally-ordering 
technology was a unique, highly developed banking system.136 During 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, England was the core and its 
regionally-ordering technology was a unique combination of 
colonialism and factory-output systems.137)  
The status and persistence of the core derives from the fact that it 
enjoys and absolute advantage, and not just a comparative advantage, 
in the organizing capitalist technology.  The absolute character of this 
advantage often comes from a particular kind of external economy of 

132. See generally BRAUDEL, supra note 111, at 21-50.  
133. See generally id. See also Ronald L. Breiger, Structures of Economic 
Interdependence Among Nations, in CONTINUITIES IN STRUCTURAL INQUIRY 353 (Peter M. 
Blau and Robert K. Merton eds., 1981); PAUL KRUGMAN, THE SELF-ORGANIZING ECONOMY 
(1996); David A. Smith & Douglas R. White, Structure and Dynamics of the Global Economy: 
Network Analysis of International Trade, 1965–1980, 70 SOCIAL FORCES 857 (1992); David 
Snyder & Edward L. Kick, Structural Position in the World System and Economic Growth, 
1955–1970: A Multiple-network Analysis of Transnational Interactions, 84 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 
1096 (1979). 
134. See BRAUDEL, supra note 111, at 21-44. 
135. See THÜNEN, supra note 50; see also Masahisa Fujita, Thünen and the New 
Economic Geography, 42 REGIONAL SCI. & URBAN ECON 907 (2012); Paul A. Samuelson, 
Thünen at Two Hundred, 21 J. ECON. LIT. 1468 (1983). 
136. See BRAUDEL, supra note 111, at 116-38. 
137. See id. at 352-85, 556-88. 
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scale called “agglomeration.”138 Agglomeration occurs when the close 
proximity of a complex diversity of synergistic industries generates 
knowledge spillovers that work to give the firms in that locale an 
absolute—rather than comparative—advantage in some core, highly 
design-sensitive industrial sector.139 The synergies that give this 
advantage are created primarily by face-to-face interaction. In order to 
take advantage of these synergies, firms have to be embedded in the 
locale. The complexity of this local inter-industrial synergy means 
that agglomeration cannot be relocated off-shore..140  
Because agglomeration bestows an absolute rather than simply 
comparative advantage on the firms in that locale, it allows those 
firms to engage in product competition rather than price 
competition,141 this allows benefiting firms to engage in a certain 
degree of monopoly pricing.142 At the same time, a greater portion of 
the corporate income generated by these synergies remains specific to 
the locale, for example in the form of higher wages and levels of 
support that employee with unique, specialized skills and training are 
able to command.143 This creates a positive feedback loop, in which 
agglomeration generates higher corporate incomes, which in turn 
allow firms to provide the higher salaries and benefits necessary to 
attract the kind of labor necessary to generate and sustain 

138. See also Michael Storper, Agglomeration, Trade, and Spatial Development: 
Bringing Dynamics Back In, 50 J. REGIONAL SCI. 313 (2010); MICHAEL STORPER, THE 
REGIONAL WORLD: TERRITORIAL DEVELOPMENT IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 83-103 (1997).  
139. See STORPER, supra note 59, at 5, 28; Venables, supra note 59; see also Gerald A. 
Carlino, Knowledge Spillovers: Cities’ Role in the New Economy, FED. RES. BANK OF PHIL. 
BUS. REV., Q4 2001, at 17. A paradigmatic example of this is found in the Los Angeles’ film 
industry. See Michael Storper & Susan Christopherson, Flexible Specialization and Regional 
Industrial Agglomerations: The Case of the U.S. Motion Picture Industry, 77 ANN. OF THE 
ASSOC. AM. GEOGRAPHERS 104 (1987).  
140. See Patricia Rice, Anthony J. Venables & Eleonora Patacchinid, Spatial 
Determinants of Productivity: Analysis for the Regions of Great Britain, 36 REG. SCI. & URB. 
ECON. 727 (2006); see also Adam B. Jaffe, Rebecca Henderson & Manuel Trajtenberg, 
Geographic Localization of Knowledge Spillovers as Evidenced by Patent Citations, 108 Q. J. 
ECON. 577 (1993); James Fleck, Expertise: Knowledge, Power and Tradability, in EXPLORING 
EXPERTISE 143, 158-59 (Robin Williams et al. eds., 1998). 
141. See STORPER, supra note 59, at 5, 28. See also SCHUMPETER, supra note 58, at 84–
85. 
142. See Charlie Karlsson & Jan Larsson, Product and Price Competition in a Regional 
Context, 69 PAPERS IN REGIONAL SCI. 82 (1990); see also SCHUMPETER, supra note 58, at 84–
85.  
143. See Michael Storper, Agglomeration, Trade, and Spatial Development: Bringing 
Dynamics Back In, 50 J. REGIONAL SCI. 313 (2010); see also Schwartz, supra note 50, at 125-
128; see also infra notes 205-211 and accompanying text (discussing the ‘competition state’).  
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agglomeration. This makes agglomeration, and the core periphery 
ordering it generates, highly persistent.144  
The farther away one moves from the core, the less one can take 
advantage of the core’s high concentration of wealth.145 This reduces 
demand for, and consequently the cost of, land.146 It reduces the 
peripheral locale’s capacity to attract high-quality labor. But at the 
same time also allows for lower wage levels.  Lesser land and labor 
costs allow local firms to enjoy lower operating costs than firms 
located closer to the core.147  Firms in more peripheral locales 
therefore enjoy comparative advantage in industries that compete with 
core firmson the bases of price.148 But such emphasis on price 
competition limits a more-peripheral local economy’s capacity to 
retain the wealth it generates through production. Lower local wages 
means lower local purchasing power compared to that of core 
economies.  Peripheral economies thus tend to be export-oriented.149 
But this means that, due to their focus on price competition, such 
economies tend to export, rather than retain, a significantly greater 
portion of the surplus value they generate by production.150 
Lessor local wealth means that peripheral economies are 
therefore much more dependent on the outside economies for capital 

144. See generally ANGUS MADDISON, THE WORLD ECONOMY: A MILLENNIAL 
PERSPECTIVE (2001). See also Giovanni Arrighi, Beverly J. Silver & Benjamin D. Brewer, 
Industrial Convergence, Globalization, and the Persistence of the North-South Divide, 38 
STUD. COMP. INT’L DEV. 3 (2003).  
145. See MASHISA FUJITA, PAUL KRUGMAN & ANTHONY J. VENABLES, THE SPATIAL 
ECONOMY: CITIES, REGIONS, AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE (1999); see also Paul Krugman & 
Anthony J. Venables, Globalization and the Inequality of Nations, 110 Q. J. ECON. 857 (1995); 
Paul Krugman, Increasing Returns and Economic Geography, 99 J. POL. ECON. 483 (1991). 
Some occasionally suggest that technologically advances are rendering transportation costs 
less relevant. Id. (showing how regional disparities disappear when transportation costs 
become sufficiently monotonic regardless of distance). But studies show that this is not yet the 
case in real life. See, e.g., Venables, supra note 59, at 3 (noting that “an 8000km distance 
chokes off over 90% of the trade that would be observed over a 1000km distance”). 
146. See also Schwartz, supra note 50, at 125. 
147. See Frederic C. Deyo, Reforming Labor, Belaboring Reform: Structural Adjustment 
in Thailand and East Asia, in GROWTH AND GOVERNANCE IN ASIA 97 (Yoichiro Sato ed., 
2004); see also Schwartz, supra note 50, at 125. 
148. See generally JOSEPH BOWRING, COMPETITION IN A DUAL ECONOMY (1986). 
149. See Schwartz, supra note 50; Deyo, supra note 147, at 125; see also supra note 145 
and accompanying text. 
150. See Karlsson & Larsson, supra note 58; see, e.g., A.J. Scott, The Semiconductor 
Industry in South-East Asia: Organization, Location and the International Division of Labour, 
21 REGIONAL STUD. 143, 143-44 (1987) (describing this in the context of the semiconductor 
industry); see also supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text (examining the limited benefits 
price competition brings to export-oriented economies). 
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and markets. This makes these economies more susceptible to 
external sources of shock and disruption—what we above called 
“volatility.”151 Local populations are thus exposed to a greater threat 
of economic and material insecurity. As a result, their demand for 
citizenship goods focus more on securing stable access to basic goods 
and services, which in peripheral economies are likely to be provided 
by local product and labor markets, and correspondingly less on 
maximization of non-material lifestyle opportunities.152 
All in all, this means that identifying a distinctly Asian 
économie-monde—and hence “Asian capitalism”—requires us to 
identify and delineate both its core-periphery structuring and the 
organizing economic technology that is centered at the core. The 
core-periphery structure of the ESE Asian regional economy has been 
well-recognized.153 The core consists primarily of Japan, South 
Korea, and Taiwan.  Singapore and Hong Kong also have core-like 
qualities, but the fact that they are small entrepôt economies limits the 
degree to which they might structure the other, more peripheral 
economies in the region. Indonesia, Laos, Cambodia and North and 
Western China are clearly peripheral. Vietnam and Thailand are also 
peripheral, albeit perhaps less so. Malaysia (due to its proximity to 
Singapore) and Eastern China (due to its proximity to Japan, Taiwan 
and South Korea) may be regarded as what Braudel termed 
“intermediate zones”—displaying some qualities of peripheral 
economies and some of more core economies.154 
This is, or course, a very rough mapping. Some locales in 
otherwise more peripheral countries may function as economic cores 
for particular industrial sectors. For example, John Gillespie has 
recently described a particular production network focusing on copper 
wire production in which South Korean firms serve as peripheral, 
upstream suppliers to more downstream Vietnamese manufacturers, 

151. See Clark, supra note 69; Deyo, supra note 147; Prasad et al., supra note 64, at 18-
28.   
152. See Inglehart, Post-materialism, supra note 94; see also supra notes 78-96 and 
accompanying text. 
153. This mapping is consistent with the presentations found in Deyo, supra note 59. See 
also Andrew Walter & Xiaoke Zhang, Debating East Asian Capitalism: Issues and Themes, in 
EAST ASIAN CAPITALISM: DIVERSITY, CONTINUITY, AND CHANGE 3 (Andrew Walter & 
Xiaoke Zhang eds., 2013); cf. Gilbert Rozman, East Asian Regionalism, in THE ROUTLEDGE 
HANDBOOK OF ASIAN REGIONALISM 22 (Mark Beeson & Richard Stubbs eds., 2012). 
154. See BRAUDEL, supra note 111, at 39-40. 
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reversing the core-periphery relationship that more generally exists 
between these countries.155 
B. The Organizing Elements of ‘Asian Capitalism’ 
In addition to its core-periphery ordering, the other feature that 
identifies and delineates an économie-monde is the presence of a 
particular economic technology that is centered at the core and that 
organizes and gives coherence to the regional economy as a whole.156 
In the context of modern North Atlantic capitalisms, this technology, 
as we saw above, is Fordism.157 The technology that organizes Asian 
capitalism, by contrast, has been termed “post Fordism”—also 
referred to as “flexible production,” or “flexible specialization.”158  
Post-Fordism focuses on promoting productive adaptability to 
respond to market changes rather than on exploiting economies of 
scale as is the case with Fordism.159  Archetypically, this involves 
responding rapidly to changes in consumer tastes and demand.160 It 
therefore tends to emphasize product competition rather than price 
competition, and tends to be centered in firms in core economic 
regions.161 
This focus on flexibility and responsiveness imparts a number of 
other distinctive features to Asian capitalism. Most particularly, it 
encourages the transnational disaggregation of production into 
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155. See John Gillespie, Managing Competition in Socialist-Transforming Asia: The 
Case of Vietnam, in ASIAN CAPITALISM AND THE REGULATION OF COMPETITION: TOWARDS A 
REGULATORY GEOGRAPHY OF GLOBAL COMPETITION LAW 164, 183-85 (Michael W. Dowdle 
et al. eds., 2013).  
156. See supra notes 136-44 and accompanying text. 
157. See supra notes 109-19 and accompanying text. 
158. See JESSOP & SUM, supra note 106, at 58-122; PIORE & SABEL, supra note 45, at 
251-80; Frederic C. Deyo & Richard F. Doner, Introduction: Economic Governance and 
Flexible Production in East Asia, in ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE AND THE CHALLENGE OF 
FLEXIBILITY IN EAST ASIA 1 (Frederic C. Deyo et al. eds., 2001).  
The characterization of post-Fordism is not without critics. Some argue that a critical 
element of post-Fordism involves the dismantling of Fordism, and thus an economy cannot 
become post-Fordist without first having been Fordism. According to this definition, only 
Japan could technically be labeled post-Fordist within the region of Asian capitalism because 
only Japan has really experienced Fordism. But at the same time, as we shall see, today’s 
Asian capitalism is very much the product of Japan’s post-Fordist economic-industrial 
ordering, and to my mind, that justified calling Asian capitalism ‘post-Fordist’ as well, because 
it is the direct projection of post-Fordist Japan. 
159. See PIORE & SABEL, supra note 45, at 251-80. 
160. See also Sabel, supra note 62. 
161. See JESSOP & SUM, supra note 106, at 58-122. 
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transnational production chains; and relatedly, it encourages greater 
reliance on relational networks rather than on positive law as a means 
of maintaining market discipline. In addition, two other distinctive 
structural features of Asian capitalism include the greater willingness 
of Asian states to intervene in their national economies, often to 
further non-economic goals; and the greater reliance on exports as 
opposed to domestic consumption. 
1. Flexible Production and Disaggregated Production Chains 
The structural feature that is perhaps most closely associated 
with Asian capitalism, and post-Fordism in general, is the 
transnational production chain—a form of production in which the 
production process is disaggregated across national boundaries in 
order to take advantages of different regional comparative 
advantages.162 The production chain model of production emerged out 
of Japanese industrial practices of the 1960s.163 During that time, 
global and regional economic instability caused Toyota and later 
other Japanese automobile manufacturers to emphasize design 
flexibility and adaptability instead of focusing on exploiting 
economies of scale. (For this reason, “flexible production” is also 
sometimes referred to—particularly in the field of industrial 
relations—as “Toyotism.”164)  
As part of this evolution, leading firms began to focus on 
developing more flexible assembly routines, more design-sensitive 
marketing operations, and more market responsive designing 

162. See John Gillespie, New Transnational Governance and the Changing Composition 
of Regulatory Pluralism in Southeast Asia, 8 ASIAN J. COMP. L. 1 (2014); Michael Carney, 
Eric Gedajlovic & Xiaohua Yang, Varieties of Asian Capitalism: Toward an Institutional 
Theory of Asian Enterprise, 26 ASIA PAC. J. MGMT. 361 (2009). There are in fact a variety of 
conceptualizations of and names for the phenomenon this article is referring to as 
“transnational production chain.” For a good overview of the different ways this phenomenon 
has been conceptualized and named, see Jennifer Bair, Global Capitalism and Commodity 
Chains: Looking Back, Going Forward, 9 COMPETITION & CHANGE 153 (2005). This 
phenomenon, what they called a “commodity chain,” was first identified by Terence K. 
Hopkins & Immanuel Wallerstein in Patterns of Development of the Modern World-System, 1 
REVIEW, A JOURNAL OF THE FERNAND BRAUDEL CENTER 111, 128 (1977). 
163. See PIORE & SABEL, supra note 45, at 223, 226; Sabel, supra note 62. 
164. See Sabel, supra note 62; see also Terje Gronning, The Emergence and 
Institutionalization of Toyotism: Subdivision and Integration of the Labour Force at the 
Toyota Motor Corporation from the 1950s to the 1970s, 18 ECON. & INDUS. DEMOC. 423 
(1997); Knuth Dohse, Ulrich Jurgens & Thomas Malsch, From “Fordism” to “Toyotism”? 
The Social Organization of the Labor Process in the Japanese Automobile Industry, 14 POL. & 
SOC. 115 (1985). 
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capacities.165 At the same time, they contracted out those aspects of 
production that remained design standardized to supplier firms 
located in more peripheral locales, to take advantage of these firm’s 
lower operating costs.166   
What further drove—and continues to drive—this disaggregation 
of (flexible) production is the different economic and production 
logics that attend to these two kinds of production.167 Design 
flexibility requires very responsive marketing that can rapidly identify 
evolving trends in consumer demand. It requires operational 
redundancy and task flexibility so as to promote experimentation, 
innovation, and productive adaptation.168 Such processes are quite 
expensive, in particular because they are highly knowledge-intensive 
and thus require a highly educated, highly trained and thus expensive 
labor force—costs for which are recuperated by the more 
monopolistic pricing allowed for by product competition.169 This type 
of labor is generally characteristic of core economic environments, 
and so this kind of production tends to be located in the regional 
core.170 
Producers of more design-standardized items, by contrast, 
obviously must compete on the basis of price. At the same time, being 
standardized, their production processes are less knowledge-intensive 
and thus less dependent on more expensive, more highly-skilled 
labor. This benefits producers located in more peripheral economies 
where land and labor costs are cheaper.171 For these firms, productive 
flexibility is grounded in flexibility in staffing, and in particular in the 
use of temporary labor, which allows firms to respond and adapt 

165.  Gary Gereffi, Shifting Governance Structures in Global Commodity Chains, With 
Special Reference to the Internet, 44 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 1616, 1617 (2001). 
166.  See Mitsuyo Ando & Fukunari Kimura, The Formation of International Production 
and Distribution Networks in East Asia, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN EAST ASIA 177 
(Takatoshi Ito & Andrew K. Rose eds., 2005); see also Sabel, supra note 62. 
167. See Deyo & Doner, supra note 158, at 3-5 
168. See Gereffi, supra note 165.  
169. See id; Deyo & Doner, supra note 158, at 15; see also SCOTT, supra note 131, at 
134-35. 
170. See Deyo & Doner, supra note 158, at 16; Richard P. Appelbaum & Gary Gereffi, 
Power and Profits in the Apparel Commodity Chain, in GLOBAL PRODUCTION: THE APPAREL 
INDUSTRY IN THE PACIFIC RIM 42, 43 (Edna Bonacich et al. eds., 1994). 
171. See Deyo & Doner, supra note 158, at 15, 22-24; see also Kang H. Park, Patterns 
and Strategies of Foreign Direct Investment: The Case of Japanese Firms, 35 APPLIED ECON. 
1739 (2003); Nagesh Kumar, Multinational Enterprises, Regional Economic Integration, and 
Export-Platform Production in the Host Countries: An Empirical Analysis for the US and 
Japanese Corporations, 134 WELTWIRTSCHAFTLICHES ARCHIV. 450, 452-55 (1998). 
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quickly to often seasonal changes in levels of consumer demand—a 
kind of productive flexibility is sometimes called “static flex” or 
“numerical flex” as contrasted with the “dynamic flex” or “functional 
flex” associated with the design flexibility that is the focus of more 
core firms.172 
It is the disaggregated and differentiated production of these 
production chains that give Asian capitalism its regional economic 
coherence and regional core-periphery structuring.173 These chains 
reify the economic interdependence and respective comparative 
advantages that both link together and functionally distinguish the 
core economies of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, with and from 
the more peripheral economies where supplier firms tend to be 
located.  
2. Relational Governance and Network Capitalism 
Of course, Asian production is not the only form of 
disaggregated production. In advanced industrial economies of the 
North Atlantic, for example, production has long been disaggregated 
as between equipment and parts manufacturers on the upstream side 
and assemblers on the downstream side. But what distinguishes the 
Asian production chain is not disaggregation per se, but the way that 
coordination is maintained among the different firms engaged in the 
disaggregated production.  
In the more traditional industrial economies of the North 
Atlantic, supplier-assembler coordination is maintained through the 
establishment of what Oliver Williamson has famously termed 
“market form” relationships174—relationships that are structured by 
formal contracts negotiated at arm’s length and enforced through 
threat of legal sanction.175 

172. Deyo & Doner, supra note 158, at 6-7 (distinguishing between static and dynamic 
flex); Vicki Smith, New Forms of Work Organizations, 23 ANN. REV. SOCIOLOGY 315, 316-17 
(1997) (distinguishing between functional and numerical flex). 
173. See also Timothy J. Sturgeon & Momko Kawakami, Global Value Chains in the 
Electronics Industry: Was the Crisis a Window of Opportunity for Developing Countries?, in 
GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS IN A POSTCRISIS WORLD 245 (Oliver Catteaneo et al. eds., 2010). 
174. OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 30-32 
(1985).           
175. On the structure of production networks in North Atlantic economies, see Gene 
Grossman & Esteban Rossi-Hansberg, The Rise of Offshoring: It’s Not Wine for Cloth 
Anymore, in THE NEW ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY: EFFECTS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 59 
(Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City ed., 2006); Robert C. Feenstra, Integration of Trade and 
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In Asian capitalism, by contrast, such coordination is much more 
commonly maintained and enforced through mutual embeddedness in 
social networks—what is sometimes called “relational capitalism” or 
“network capitalism.”176 Asia’s greater resort to relational and 
network forms of capitalisms is due to a number of factors. One is 
that, as described above, the structuring of production networks 
results in greater inter-firm interdependence, and this encourages 
these firms to engage in what Oliver Williamson has termed relational 
contracting as opposed to arm’s length contracting.177  
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Transnational Governance and the Changing Composition of Regulatory Pluralism in 
Southeast Asia, 9 ASIAN J. COMP. L. 65 (2014). 
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Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives, 36 
ADMIN. SCI. Q. 269 (2001); Mark Granovetter, Business Groups and Social Organization, in 
HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY 429 (Neil Smelser & Richard Swedberg eds., 2005). 
The relational character of Asian capitalism is often referred to—particularly by 
advocates of liberal market economies—as “crony capitalism.” But in fact, Asian relationalism 
is much, more complex than captured by the epithet. See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Opening Address: 
Knowledge for Development: Economic Science, Economic Policy, and Economic Advice, in 
ANNUAL WORLD BANK CONFERENCE ON DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS 1998 9, 17-18 (Boris 
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see also infra notes 315-50 and accompanying text (discussing regulatory capture in Asia).  
     177. See Henry Wai-Chung Yeung, Globalizing Competition in Asia: An Evolutionary 
Perspective, in ASIAN CAPITALISM AND THE REGULATION OF COMPETITION: TOWARDS A 
REGULATORY GEOGRAPHY OF GLOBAL COMPETITION LAW 265, 276-77, 279-80 (Michael W. 
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Relatedly, post-Fordism’s more dynamic focus on flexibility and 
responsiveness discourages rule-based governance.178 This is because 
in order to be effective, rule-based governance (including private rule-
based governance established via contracting) must operate in a larger 
socio-economic environment that is generally stable and 
predictable179—the more volatile the regulatory environment, the 
more likely it is that an abstract rule will have unintended 
consequences over time.180 Due to its greater reliance on outside 
economies for consumption and finance, the kinds of economies in 
which Asian capitalism tends to operate—indeed, the kinds of 
economies in which it was designed to operate—tend to be more 
volatile.181  
Finally, particularly insofar as state governance is concerned, 
rule-based governance is also discouraged by the greater 
fragmentation of socio-economic and regulatory space caused both by 
transnational production chains and by greater firm reliance on 
transnational sources of finance. This causes local firms and even 
local economies to become more deeply embedded into transnational 
economic and regulatory environments,182 and consequently less 
responsive to domestic regulatory structures—a phenomenon that 
Kanishka Jayasuriya termed the “hollowing out of the [Asian] 
state.”183  
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179.  See PIORE & SABEL, supra note 45, at 165-83; WILLIAMSON, supra note 174, at 
56-61; cf. STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE: THE EXPANSION OF 
NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES, 1877-1920, at 24-31 (1982) (arguing that rule of 
law would not have effective in pre-industrial America due to the geographical fragmentation 
of its social environments). 
180. Cf. Richard Vernon, Unintended Consequences, 7 POL. THEORY 57, 68 (1979) 
(discussing the effect of ‘contextual change’ on rule-based systems). 
181. See Jason Furman & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Economic Crises: Evidence and Insights 
from East Asia, 1998 (2) BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 1, 6-7, 13-14 (1998); 
see also William Easterly, Roumeen Islam & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Shaken and Stirred: 
Explaining Growth Volatility, in ANNUAL WORLD BANK CONFERENCE ON DEVELOPMENT 
ECONOMICS 2000 at 191, 198 (Boris Pleskovic & Nicholas Sterm eds., 2001); cf. Clark, supra 
note 69 (discussing distinctive volatility of transnational finance). The distinct volatility of the 
Asian economie-monde is also caused in part by its pronounced dependence on exports. See 
infra notes 215-19 and accompanying text. 
182. See Yeung, supra note 177; see, e.g., Gillespie, supra note 155 (exploring 
regulatory fragmentation in the context of Vietnam). 
183. See Kanishka Jayasuriya, Globalization and the Changing Architecture of the state: 
The Regulatory state and the Politics of Negative Co-ordination, 8 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 101 
(2001). 
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Because different domestic firms and locales often become 
embedded into different transnational environments, they will 
sometimes respond differently from each other to some particular 
domestic regulatory input. 184 All this demands greater use of face-to-
face and case-by-case regulation, i.e., relational governance, since 
such fragmentation tends to cause regulation by abstract, arm’s length 
rulemaking to have lesser, different, and often unforeseeable effects 
on different domestic actors depending on the particular transnational 
environment in which that actor is embedded.185 
This preference for relational forms of capitalism can be seen 
operating across a number of dimensions. In the area of private, firm-
to-firm relationships, perhaps the archetypical example of this is 
found in the distinctive economic conglomerates known as keiretsu in 
Japan and chaebol in South Korea.186 These conglomerates use 
private forms of informal ordering to advance what are in effect 
private industrial policies that in North Atlantic economies would be 
created and advanced by public institutions.187Another example is the 
distinctive intra-regional, ethnically-based trading and financial 
networks that have emerged out of many centuries of Chinese 
diaspora, and that continue to play a significant role in many of the 
more peripheral economies of the Asian économie-monde.188 ESE 
Asia’s historically greater tolerance for cartelization is also sometimes 
characterized as a reflection of preference for more relational forms of 
private economic ordering.189 

184. See, e.g., Dowdle, supra note 51 (exploring this in the context of China). 
185. See, e.g., Gillespie, supra note 155 (exploring this in the context of Vietnam); see 
also Michael W. Dowdle, The Peripheral Regulatory State, in THE RISE OF THE REGULATORY 
STATE OF THE SOUTH: INFRASTRUCTURE AND DEVELOPMENT IN EMERGING ECONOMIES 209, 
214 (Navroz Dubash & Bronwen Morgan eds., 2013) (discussing case-by-case governance); 
Elinor Ostrom, James Walker & Roy Gardner, Covenants With and Without a Sword: Self-
Governance is Possible, 86 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 404 (1992) (discussing face-to-face 
governance); cf. SKOWRONEK, supra note 179, at 24-31 (arguing that rule of law would not 
have effective in pre-industrial America due to the geographical fragmentation of its social 
environments). 
186. See James R. Lincoln, Micahel L. Gerlach & Chjristina L. Ahmadjian, Keiretsu 
Networks and Corporate Performance in Japan, 61 AM. SOCIO. REV. 67 (1996); see also 
Prosser, supra note 9, at 253-61. 
187. See Yeung, supra note 177; GERBER, supra note 4, at 205-22.  
188. See Gordon C.K. Cheung, The Significance of the Overseas Chinese in East Asia, in  
THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF ASIAN REGIONALISM 77-89 (Mark Beeson & Richard Stubbs 
eds., 2012). 
189. See, e.g., Frank K. Upham, Privatized Regulation: Japanese Regulatory Style in 
Comparative Perspective, 20 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 396-511 (1996). 
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A second dimension of Asian relational governance involves 
firm-state relations. This is reflected in a pronounced preference on 
the part of the state for directing regulatory outcomes through 
informal negotiation with core firms rather than through neutral 
application of abstract regulatory rules.190  
The archetypical example of this is Japan’s regulatory practice 
of administrative guidance. Under administrative guidance, public 
agencies regulate economic behavior by giving informal and often 
extralegal regulatory requests to particular firms or industries, and 
being much more willing to grant discretionary favors or privileges to 
those firms that choose to comply, while being much less responsive 
to needs and requests of those firms that choose to ignore such 
requests. All this takes place outside the reach of the formal legal-
regulatory system.191 Similar forms of informal regulation can be 
found operating throughout Asia.192 Asian preference for delegating 
regulatory responsibilities to politically-embedded, executive 
regulatory agencies as opposed to the politically-disembedded 
“independent regulatory agencies (“IRAs”) favored in by North 
Atlantic economies (as discussed further below) is another example of 
Asia’s preference for more relationally-oriented forms of public 
regulation.193 

190. See Peter B. Evans, EMBEDDED AUTONOMY: STATE AND INDUSTRIAL 
TRANSFORMATION (1995); Wade, supra note 175; Edmund Terence Gomez, Introduction: 
Political Business in East Asia, in POLITICAL BUSINESS IN EAST ASIA 1 (Edmund Terence 
Gomez ed., 2002). 
191. See JOHN O. HALEY, AUTHORITY WITHOUT POWER: LAW AND THE JAPANESE 
PARADOX (1992). 
192. See generally John K.M. Ohnesorge, Developing Development Theory: Law and 
Development Orthodoxies and the Northeast Asian Experience, 28 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 
219 (2007); see, e.g., Meredith Woo-Cumings, Diverse Paths toward ‘the Right Institutions’: 
Law, the state, and Economic Reform in East Asia 21-26 (ADB Institute Working Paper No. 
18, April 2001) (Korea); Hyuk-Rae Kim, Fragility or Continuity? Economic Governance of 
East Asian Capitalism, in POLITICS AND MARKETS IN THE WAKE OF THE ASIAN CRISIS 99, 
112-13 (Richard Robison ed., 2000); John Ohnesorge, Chinese Administrative Law in the 
Northeast Asian Mirror, 16 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 103 (2006); Martin Painter, 
The Politics of Economic Restructuring in Vietnam: The Case of State-owned Enterprise 
Reform, 25 CONTEMPORARY SOUTHEAST ASIA 20 (2003). For a theoretical defence of 
administrative guidance within the context of post-Fordism, see Sabel, supra note 62.  
193. See infra notes 299-314 and accompanying text.  
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Such public-private regulatory embeddedness is also closely 
associated with what is called “state capitalism,”194 another 
distinguishing feature of Asian capitalism, and to which we now turn. 
3. “State Capitalism” 
Asian states also show a distinct willingness to proactively direct 
domestic market outcomes—a task they often pursue using relational 
forms of administrative governance, as discussed above195. Following 
the terminology advanced by Aldo Masacchio and Sergio G. 
Lazzarini, this is frequently referred to as “state capitalism,” i.e., an 
economic regulatory practice in which the government assumes some 
direct role in the economy and uses it to shape economic outcomes, 
often to advance non-economic as well as economic goals.196 Asian 
resort to State capitalism also may be encouraged in part by the small 
size of many of Asia’s national economies,197 in which some State 
intervention in the economy may be necessary to promote the 
development of minimal efficient economies of scale in core, export-
oriented industries.198 
Examples of state capitalism in Asia include the “developmental 
state,”199 the “competition state,”200 the use of sovereign welfare 
funds,201 and the use of state-owned enterprises.202 The developmental 

194. See CHALMERS JOHNSON, MITI AND THE JAPANESE MIRACLE: THE GROWTH OF 
INDUSTRIAL POLICY, 1925-1975 (1982); see also Upham, supra note 189.  
195. See supra note 190 and accompanying text.  
196. See Aldo Masacchio & Sergio G. Lazzarini, Leviathan in Business: Varieties of 
state Capitalism and their Implications for Economic Performance 3-4, 11 (Harvard Business 
School Working Papers No. 12-108, 2012). This is a somewhat broader definition than is 
sometimes used. See Ian Bremmer & Devin T. Stewart, China’s State Capitalism Poses 
Ethical Challenges, ASIA TIMES (Aug. 17, 2010) (defining “state capitalism” as “a system in 
which governments use state-owned companies and investment vehicles to dominate market 
activity”); Li-Wen Lin & Curtis J. Milhaupt, We are the (National) Champions: 
Understanding: The Mechanisms of State Capitalism in China, 65 STAN. L. REV. 697 (2013).  
197. See Mark Beeson, Southeast Asia and the Politics of Vulnerability, 23 THIRD 
WORLD Q. 549 (2002). 
198. Cf. GAL, supra note 102. 
199. See Chalmers Johnson, The Developmental State: Odyssey of a Concept, in THE 
DEVELOPMENTAL STATE 32 (Meredith Woo-Cumings ed., 1999); Adrian Leftwitch, Bringing 
Politics Back In: Towards a Model of the Developmental State, 31 J. DEV. STUD. 400 (1995). 
200. See, e.g., Philip G. Cerny, Paradoxes of the Competition State: The Dynamics of 
Globalization, 32 GOVERNMENT & OPPOSITION 251 (1997); BOB JESSOP, THE FUTURE OF THE 
CAPITALIST STATE 96 (2002). 
201. See Eric Helleiner & Troy Lundblad, States, Markets, and Sovereign Wealth Funds, 
4 GER. POL’Y STUD. / POLITIKFELDANALYSE 59 (2008); see also Ronald J. Gilson & Curtis J. 
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state is perhaps the paradigmatic example of Asian state capitalism. 
The developmental state is a developmental strategy in which state 
policymakers direct material and regulatory support to particular 
industries and particular firms in order to promote these firms’ 
competitiveness in the global economy. Material support most 
commonly comes in the form of special access to capital or protection 
from competition in domestic markets. Regulatory support comes 
from close embeddedness with government regulators.203 Such 
economic and regulatory support is generally closely linked to 
industrial policymaking—the development of strategic, long-range 
plans to develop particular domestic industrial sectors.204 
More recently, there is evidence that particularly in core Asian 
economies, the developmental state is evolving into what first Philip 
Cerny205 and later Bob Jessop206 have termed a “competition state.” 
The competition state focuses on promoting spatial competitiveness, 
competitiveness attaches vest in the place of the locale rather than in 
the firm per se.  It emerged in response to the fact that core firms have 
been disembedding themselves from national economies and 
regulatory structures, and instead are becoming increasingly 
embedded into transnational economies and economic networks.207 In 
doing so, they not only remove themselves from the reach of domestic 
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Milhaupt, Sovereign Wealth Funds and Corporate Governance: A Minimalist Response to the 
New Mercantilism, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1345, 1346 (2007). 
202. See Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 196, at 746. 
203. See also supra notes 190-91 and accompanying text (discussing ‘administrative 
guidance’). 
204. See, e.g., CHALMERS JOHNSON, MITI AND THE JAPANESE MIRACLE: THE GROWTH 
OF INDUSTRIAL POLICY, 1925-1975 (1982). See generally DANIEL YERGIN & JOSEPH 
STANISLAW, THE COMMANDING HEIGHTS: THE BATTLE FOR THE WORLD ECONOMY 139-84 
(2002). Further economic justification for the developmental state can be found in concern for 
“minimum efficient scale of production” [MES], which we discussed above in the context of 
the small economies limitation to the orthodox model of competition law. See supra notes 102-
05 and accompanying text. Even the core economies of Asia have historically been ‘small’ 
compared to the core economies of the North Atlantic. Protection and promotion of domestic 
sectors and firms was an effective way of promoting the development of MES in the context of 
Asia’s smaller economies, particularly during earlier periods of industrial development. See 
Ha-joon Chang, Economic Theory of the Developmental State, in THE DEVELOPMENTAL 
STATE 182 (Meredith Woo-Cumings ed., 1999); see, e.g., Danny M. Leipziger, Industrial 
Restructuring In Korea, 16 WORLD DEV. 121 (1988). 
205. See Philip G. Cerny, Paradoxes of the Competition State: The Dynamics of 
Globalization, 32 GOVERNMENT & OPPOSITION 251 (1997). 
206. See Jessop, supra note 19, at 96. 
207. See Yeung, supra note 177. 
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state industrial guidance, but their economic and developmental 
successes bring less benefit to the territorially-bound state.208  
The competition state promotes spatial competitiveness by 
stimulating the development of local agglomeration effects, which as 
we saw above are spatially embedded. A good example of this is 
found in the “industrial parks” that many Asian states began setting 
up in the late 1970s and have continued setting up to this day. As 
described in a study by Frederick Deyo: 
At the [Hsinchu Science Industrial Park], as described by Lin 
Chien-ju, an ensemble of large electronics firms and small high-
tech suppliers, together facing high levels of worker turnover 
among both operators and engineers, were supported in part by 
government programs that addressed a broad range of shared 
problems relating to all phases of production.  These included an 
Employment Services Center that provided both job placement 
and assistance with training and R&D activities. As well, special 
tax incentives were introduced to allow companies to use stock 
bonuses to attract and retain engineers, and an Industrial 
Technology Research Institute was established to encourage 
professional collaboration and networking among engineers and 
technical workers and to foster technology transfer from foreign 
companies.209 
Discussing the benefits of these parks, Deyo notes: 
First, as noted earlier, inter-firm and professional/technical 
networks provide modalities for job search, reputation building, 
and career development that are often compromised by growing 
labor market contingency and flexibility. Second, the provision 
and promotion of training, a critical function of industrial labor 
systems from the standpoints both of employers and workers, has 
become increasingly important and problematic in the context of 
organizational de-verticalization, growing economic turbulence, 
market segmentation, new technologies favoring small dynamic 
firms, and the growth of contingent and contractual work across 
all skill groups, including professionals. The state’s role in 
creating or facilitating the development of dynamic supply chains 

208. See also Philip G. Cerny, Political Globalization and the Competition State, in 
POLITICAL ECONOMY AND THE CHANGING GLOBAL ORDER 300 (Richard Stubbs & Geoffrey 
R.D. eds., 3d ed. 2005). 
209. Deyo, supra note 59, at 283 (citing Lin Chien-ju, Institutions, Local Politics, and 
Firm Strategies: Two Labor Systems in Taiwan (Binghamton University Department of 
Sociology, Ph.D. dissertation, 2010)). 
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and industrial parks can play an important role in this regard . . . .  
Third, and as important are the entrepreneurial incentives and 
opportunities network promotional policies create for workers . . . 
. Of particular interest here are opportunities for technical and 
engineering workers to start new businesses, in some cases as 
spin-off firms supported or sponsored by their former employers. 
Such spin-offs occur most often in large, well established clusters 
with nearby research institutions.210 
Interestingly, efforts to develop such industrial parks in the more 
peripheral economies of Asia and elsewhere have not met with the 
same levels of success, reflecting the distinct advantage that the core 
has vis-à-vis the periphery in cultivating agglomeration effects.211 
Two other examples of state capitalism closely associated with 
Asia are sovereign wealth funds and the use of state-owned 
enterprises. Asian states use sovereign wealth funds – state managed 
international investment vehicles that in the context of Asian states 
are often funded by the state’s foreign exchange reserves212 – not only 
for financial gain, but also as devices for securing national autonomy 
and security against the threat of the volatility brought about by 
exposure to global markets.213 Asian countries, particularly but not 
exclusively the state-socialist countries of China and Vietnam, also 
use state ownership and control of large domestic firms, i.e., state-

210. Id. at 283. 
211. Compare Deyo, supra note 59, at 292-94 (describing the workings of East Asian 
“high-tech industrial park” model the core economies of Taiwan, South Korea and Singapore), 
with id. at 294-97 (describing what happened when the more peripheral economies of Asia 
have tried to implement that model); see also José A. Borello, Hernán Morhorlang & Diego 
Silva Failde, Agglomeration Economies in Semi-Industrialized Countries: Some Evidence from 
Argentina and Some General Inferences about Research and Policy in Similar Countries 
(paper presented at the Association of American Geographers 2008 Annual Meeting, April 19, 
2008), available at http://umconference.um.edu.my/upload/43-1/papers/
172%20JoseABorello_HernanMorhorlang_DiegoSilvaFailde.pdf (describing difficulties in 
achieving agglomeration effects in automotive and steel sectors in Buenos Aires); cf. John 
Luke Gallup, Jeffrey D. Sachs & Andrew Mellinger, Geography and Economic Development, 
22 INT’L REGIONAL SCI. REV. 179, 184 (1999) (noting how high urban-population densities 
promote economic development in some kinds of geographies but seem to impede 
development in other kinds of geographies); Ronen Palan, The Emergence of an Offshore 
Economy, 30 FUTURES 63 (1998). 
212. See Gilson & Milhaupt, supra note 201, at 1358. 
213. See Donghyun Park & Gemma Bolotaulo Estrada, Developing Asia’s Sovereign 
Wealth Funds and Outward Foreign Direct Investment 3(Asian Development Bank Economics 
Working Paper Series No. 169, 2009); cf. Gilson & Milhaupt, supra note 201, at 1346. Some 
suspect Asian countries, particularly China, of using international investment from sovereign 
wealth funds to gain strategically capacity to influence the political or economic environments 
in host countries. See id. at 1349-50. 
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owned enterprises, to similar effect.  They also use state-owned 
enterprises to advance non-economic, social and political goals, such 
as to provide employment and social welfare or, more nefariously, to 
promote the state’s control over society.214 
4. Export Orientation and “Producerism” 
Finally, Asian capitalism is also associated with the export 
orientation of its core economies.215 As is evident from the description 
above, under the classic core-periphery ordering of North Atlantic 
Fordism, core economies tend to be consumption oriented.216 By 
contrast, even the principal core industrial economies of ESE Asia—
Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea—are markedly export-oriented, 
driven in large part by producing high-quality, design-competitive 
goods for consumers in other parts of the globe.217  
Consistent with its export orientation, Asian capitalism has 
shown a distinct orientation towards “producerism,” i.e., having a 
greater portion of the surplus values created by production accrue to 
the producer rather than the consumer—although this appears to be 
changing. As described by James Crotty and Gary Dymski: 
Another theme of East Asian development has been deferred 
gratification for consumers. Tight constraints have been imposed 
on the domestic consumer goods market in order to free up 
resources for investment and exports. Current consumption has 
been sacrificed for high rates of capital accumulation, and thus 
for future consumption. The guiding idea has been that household 
needs would be met by the sheer pace of growth.218 
The export orientation of Asia’s core economies makes Asian 
capitalism less autonomous and more volatile as compared to North 

214. See generally DANWEI: THE CHANGING CHINESE WORKPLACE IN HISTORICAL AND 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (Xiaobo Lu & Elizabeth Perry eds., 1997); see also Louis 
Putterman, Dualism and Reform in China, 40 ECON. DEV. & CULTURAL CHANGE 467 (1992). 
In the case of Vietnam, see Painter, supra note 192, at 35. 
215. See generally JESSOP & SUM, supra note 106, at 161-74.  
216. See Schwartz, supra note 50, BOWRING, supra note 148; see also Whitman, supra 
note 48;  cf. infra note 149 and accompanying text. 
217. See also Shin-ichi Fukuda & Hideki Toya, Conditional Convergence in East Asian 
Countries: The Role of Exports in Economic Growth, in GROWTH THEORIES IN LIGHT OF THE 
EAST ASIAN EXPERIENCE 247 (Takatoshi Ito & Anne O. Krueger eds., 1995). 
218. James Crotty & Gary Dymski, Can the Global Neoliberal Regime Survive Victory 
in Asia? The Political Economy of the Asian Crisis, 5 INT’L PAPERS IN POL. ECON. 1, 8 
(1998); see also Ian Holliday, Productivist Welfare Capitalism: Social Policy in East Asia, 48 
POL. STUD. 706 (2000). 
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Atlantic Fordism, which further encourages promotion of relational as 
opposed to legalist styles of public and private governance.219 
C. Asian Capitalism as Variegated Capitalism 
These four features of Asian capitalism combine to generate a 
fifth distinguishing aspect of Asian capitalism, one that will turn out 
to be critical to our understanding of the nature of Asian competition 
regulation. This is its “variegated” character. The orthodox “varieties 
of capitalism” literature portrays each variety as national in scope, 
internally homogeneous, and autonomous vis-à-vis other possible 
varieties of capitalism. Thus, according to it, the United States has a 
liberal market economy (“LME”) and nothing but a liberal market 
economy. Germany, on the other hand, has a coordinated market 
economy (“CME”) and nothing but a coordinated market economy.  
And the LME character of the US national economy has no structural 
connection—no symbiosis—to the LME or CME character of any 
other national economy.220 
We might refer to this as the “monistic” conceptualization of 
national capitalism. Asian capitalism, by contrast, is not structured 
this way. It is structured along the lines of what Jamie Peck and Nik 
Theodore have referred to as “variegated capitalism.”221 Variegated 
capitalism describes a condition in which multiple varieties of 
capitalisms coexist within a single national economic space.222  

219. See supra notes 174-93 and accompanying text. 
220. See Jamie Peck & Nik Theodore, Variegated Capitalism, 31 PROGRESS HUM. 
GEOGRAPHY 731 (2007). 
221. Id. To be clear, Peck and Theodore advance the idea of ‘variegated capitalism’ as a 
research agenda, not as a particular kind of capitalism. So I am misusing their idea somewhat 
by conceptualizing it as a particular variety of capitalism. But I think that alternative 
characterization can be justified by observing that, while all capitalisms are ‘variegated’ to 
some degree (the observation that recommends variegated capitalism as a research agenda), 
some manifestations of capitalism nevertheless might be significantly more variegated than 
others, and in this way justify being characterized as variegated in contradistinction to other, 
less variegated varieties of capitalism.  
222. Compare id. with Andrew Walter & Xiaoke Zhang, Understanding Variations and 
Changes in East Asian Capitalism, in EAST ASIAN CAPITALISM: DIVERSITY, CONTINUITY, 
AND CHANGE 247, 273 (Andrew Walter & Xiaoke Zhang eds., 2013): 
Patterns of business organization, corporate governance, and employment relations 
within each East Asian political economy vary along more institutional dimensions than 
can be easily and parsimoniously captured here. More systematic research needs to be 
done not only to identify the trajectories and properties of internal diversity but also to 
explore the impact of rising heterogeneity on the organizational cohesiveness of the 
national systems of economic governance . . . . [I]nternal diversity and hybridity may 
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In the context of Asian capitalism, these include post-Fordist 
flexible specialization—that is organized around exports, 
transnational product competition, and disaggregated production; 
more peripheral supplier capitalisms organized around transnational 
price competition, numerical flex, and embeddedness in transnational 
production networks;223 the network capitalisms that govern the 
transnational economies of these production chains;224 localized, 
sometimes pre-industrial capitalisms organized around local domestic 
markets;225 various state capitalisms devoted to a variety of non-
economic goals—e.g., economic development and national 
autonomy;226 various “welfare capitalisms” that provide for the social 
security of the population227—what, following the Europeans, we 
might call “solidarity capitalisms” that focus on providing citizenship 
goods;228 and even traditional Fordist capitalisms of the kind 
presumed by the orthodox model, often devoted to producing lower-
end exports for transnational consumer markets.229 
This diversity is not merely present in the region as a whole, but 
within many of the region’s individual, national economies. For 
example, in Japan, core transnational firms tend to operate in markets 
governed by post-Fordist capitalisms;230 upstream suppliers to these 
firms tend to operate in markets governed by transnational network 
capitalisms; and local economies are organized around localized 
relational kinds of capitalisms.231  There is also a developmental-state 
state capitalism that governs national champions,232 and welfare 
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help to buttress the existing order of economic governance by infusing it with 
institutional dynamism and allowing it to adapt incrementally to pressures for change. 
223. See Deyo & Doner, supra note 158. 
224. See Yeung, supra note 177. 
225. See, e.g., PHONGPAICHIT & BAKER, supra note 69; cf. JAMES C. SCOTT, THE ART 
OF NOT BEING GOVERNED: AN ANARCHIST HISTORY OF UPLAND SOUTHEAST ASIA (2011). 
226. See supra notes 197, 213 and accompanying text. 
227. See supra note 214 and accompanying text. 
228. See supra note 83.  
229. See Alain Lipietz, Towards Global Fordism?, 132 NEW LEFT REV. 33, 38-46 
(1982); see also Alain Lipietz, The Post-Fordist World: Labour Relations, International 
Hierarchy and Global Ecology, 4 REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 1, 7-12 (1997). 
230. See Makoto Itoh, The Japanese Model of Post-Fordism, in PATHWAYS TO 
INDUSTRIALIZATION AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT 116 (Allen J. Scott & Michael Storper 
eds., 1992). 
231. See, e.g., Tomoyo Matsui, Corporate Governance and Closely-held Companies in 
Japan: The Untold Story, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE 21ST CENTURY 108 (Luke 
Nottage et al. eds., 2008); see Upham, supra note 189 (on Japanese regulation of competition 
involving small local stores). 
232. See JOHNSON, supra note 194. 
348 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 38:301 
capitalisms that govern labor markets and the markets that support 
small local businesses.233 
In China, the firms that occupy the commanding heights of the 
national economy operate in markets that are governed by state 
capitalisms ,234 while private firms competing in lower-order sectors 
tend to compete in markets governed by Fordist capitalism, as do 
those that compete in much of China’s export sector.235 Pre-industrial 
capitalisms can found in peripheral agricultural regions and 
markets.236 
Similarly, in his studies of Vietnam, John Gillespie has 
identified at least three distinct varieties of capitalist market 
organization.  These include what he calls “cadre capitalism”—a form 
of network capitalism that organizes markets in core domestic 
industrial sectors like the construction industry;237 a more 
transnationally-embedded, largely Fordist form of capitalism in which 
many medium-sized enterprises in urban areas operate—what 
Gillespie refers to as the “LME” (large and medium enterprise) 
capitalism;238 and often more localized network capitalisms that 
structure the markets in which smaller firms operate, what he calls 
“SME” (small and medium enterprise) capitalism.239 
Many of these different kinds of capitalism function to exploit 
particular market dynamics that are not well-addressed by the 
orthodox model of competition law.240 For example, post-Fordist 
capitalisms look to exploit dynamic efficiency and product markets.241 

233. See Philip Manow, Welfare state Building and Coordinated Capitalism in Japan 
and Germany, in THE ORIGINS OF NONLIBERAL CAPITALISM: GERMANY AND JAPAN IN 
COMPARISON 94 (Wolfgang Streeck & Kǀzǀ Yamamura eds., 2001); see Philip Manow, 
Business Coordination, Wage Bargaining and the Welfare state: Germany and Japan in 
Comparative Historical Perspective, in COMPARING WELFARE CAPITALISM: SOCIAL POLICY 
AND POLITICAL ECONOMY IN EUROPE, JAPAN AND THE USA 27-51(Bernhard Ebbinghaus & 
Philip Manow eds., 2004); see Upham, supra note 189. 
234. See Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 196. 
235. See, e.g., Dowdle, supra note 51. 
236. See, e.g., id. 
237. See Gillespie, supra note 155, at 177-80. 
238. Id. at 180-85; see also John Gillespie, Exploring the Role of Legitimacy and Identity 
in Framing Responses to Global Legal Reforms in Socialist Transforming Asia, 29 WIS. INT’L 
L.J. 534, 563-68 (2011). 
239. See Gillespie, supra note 155, at 185-91; see also Gillespie, supra note 238, at 566-
69. 
240. See generally supra notes 46-105 and accompanying text. 
241. See supra notes 162-73 and accompanying text; supra notes 56-73 and 
accompanying text 
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Networked capitalisms often emerge in response to prolonged 
economic volatility.242 Local capitalisms often involve the provision 
of citizenship goods, particularly in more peripheral regions.243  And 
state capitalisms, as we have seen, can work in response to host of 
non-economic as well as economic concerns.244 The greater internal 
complexity of variegated capitalism as compared to more monistic 
varieties of capitalisms requires a more complex regulatory response 
than that provided by the orthodox model. This is the subject of our 
next Part. 
III. REGULATING COMPETITION UNDER ASIAN CAPITALISM: 
COMPETITION REGULATION AS ‘POLITICAL REGULATION’ 
The Fordist predicates of the orthodox model make it a poor fit 
for many of the forms of capitalism that populate Asia’s post-Fordist 
economic space. Moreover, the variegated nature of of that economic 
space large demands a pluralist, as opposed to monistic, mode of 
organizing competition regulation, since each of the diverse forms of 
capitalism that comprise Asia’s variegated, national capitalist systems 
has its own, distinct form of competition, and thus its own distinct, 
market-regulatory needs. As we shall see, all this demands a 
“political” form of regulation, as opposed to the often anti-political, 
“juristic” form of competition regulation advanced by the orthodox 
model. 
A. Variegated Capitalism and Regulatory Pluralism 
Due to its Fordist predicates, the orthodox model of competition 
regulation is ill-suited for many aspects of Asian capitalism. The 
orthodox model presumes that market competition is driven 
foundationally by price competition, whereas many of the capitalisms 
in Asia’s variegated capitalism—particularly its dominant form of 
capitalism, that of post-Fordism—is driven to significant extent by 
product competition.245 The orthodox model is consumerist in 
orientation, whereas key organizing sectors of Asian capitalism—
including its core economy—are export-oriented, and therefore better 

242. See supra notes 179-81 and accompanying text. 
243. See supra notes 77-105 and accompanying text.  
244. See supra notes 213-14 and accompanying text.   
245. Compare supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text (discussing orthodox model), 
with supra notes 167-72 and accompanying text (discussing Asian capitalism). 
350 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 38:301 
suited to producerism.246 The orthodox model presumes a relatively 
stable economic environment, whereas, again, Asian capitalism was 
developed in significant part to operate in and respond to more 
volatile economic environments.247 The orthodox model assumes a 
national economy that is sufficiently large to generate minimally 
efficient economies of scale, whereas many Asian economies are 
unable to generate such economies of scale, either due to small 
national size or internal segmentation and fragmentation. The 
orthodox model presumes a relatively uniform capitalist structure, 
whereas, again, Asian capitalism generates much more variegated 
arenas of capitalist market competition.248  
All this demands a correspondingly variegated structure of 
competition regulation, one which is able to accomodate a wide 
variety of centrifugal capitalist forces operating at various levels and 
scales throughout the region. At the national level, for example, 
modes of competition are often diversified by the foreign-imposed 
nature of many national competition laws, which have frequently 
been demanded or counseled by international financial institutions 
(“IFIs”) and by foreign governments as a condition for international 
assistance or market access.249 Such foreign-transplanted legislation 
often penetrates local society unevenly, causing some industrial and 
social sectors to adapt these more orthodox modes of competition, 
while other sectors prove more resistant.250 
At the regional level, transnational production chains also work 
to diversify processes of economic competition. As we saw, the 
transnational disaggregation of production allows firms in core 

246. Compare supra notes 29-35 and accompanying text (discussing orthodox model), 
with supra notes 215-19 and accompanying text (discussing Asian capitalism). 
247. Compare supra note 63 and accompanying text (discussing orthodox model), with 
supra note 160 and accompanying text (discussing Asian capitalism). 
248. See Gunther Teubner, Idiosyncratic Production Regimes: Co-evolution of Economic 
and Legal Institutions in the Varieties of Capitalism, in THE EVOLUTION OF CULTURAL 
ENTITIES 161 (Michael Wheeler et al. eds., 2002). 
249. See Franz Kronthaler & Johannes Stephan, Factors Accounting for the Enactment 
of a Competition Law—An Empirical Analysis, 52 ANTITRUST BULL. 137, 159-60 (2007); see 
also M.R.A. Palim, The Worldwide Growth of Competition Law: An Empirical Analysis, 43 
ANTITRUST BULL. 105, 125-32 (1998). 
250. See, e.g., Matsui, supra note 231 (showing this in Japan); Simon Vande Walle, 
Competition and Competition Law in Japan: Between Scepticism and Embrace, in ASIAN 
CAPITALISM AND THE REGULATION OF COMPETITION: TOWARDS A REGULATORY 
GEOGRAPHY OF GLOBAL COMPETITION LAW 123 (Michael W. Dowdle et al. eds., 2013); 
Gillespie, supra note 155; Ohseung Kwon, Retrospect and Prospect on Korean Antitrust Law, 
4 J. KOREAN L. 1, 20-28 (2005). 
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national economies to focus much more single-mindedly on product 
competition, while at the same time causing upstream firms to focus 
in more peripheral nations or regions to focus on price competition.251 
Similar bifurcations can also be found even within national 
economies, as,many ESE Asian nations are large enough to 
encompass both core and peripheral regions. The clearest example of 
this is the context of Asian capitalism is that of China,252 but core-
periphery bifurcations can be found in most other Asian countries—
with the obvious exceptions of Hong Kong and Singapore, of course. 
A good demonstration of this is found in John Gillespie’s recent study 
of core vs. peripheral industries in Vietnam.253 
At the local level, core-periphery differentiations cause 
corresponding differentiations in the content and delivery of 
citizenship goods. As noted above, populations in poorer and more 
peripheral locales tend to focus their demands for citizenship goods 
on goods and services that promote security and stability.254 In 
contrast to in more core economies, such goods and services are often 
better provided for in more peripheral environments by channeling 
them through existing local markets—both labor markets and product 
markets—rather than through public tax and redistribution schemes, 
even when it may cost the locale something in the way of market 
efficiency.255 This, in turn, will shape the way that competition works 
in these markets, differentiating them from other kinds of local 
markets that do not play such a significant role in directly providing 
welfare stability.256 
In sum, the variegated nature of competition in Asian capitalism 
means that there is no single, monistic regulatory system for 
regulating market competition.257 The distinct forms of capitalisms 
that comprise Asia’s variegated capitalism each have their own, 
distinct competitive logic: some are driven by price competition, 
some are driven by market competition;258 some are devoted purely to 
economic efficiency, some serve important social functions;259 some 
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251. See supra notes 162-73 and accompanying text. 
252. See Dowdle, supra note 51. 
253. See John Gillespie, supra note 238, at 559-68. 
254. See supra notes 94-101 and accompanying text.  
255. See supra notes 84-89 and accompanying text. 
256. See, e.g., PHONGPAICHIT & BAKER, supra note 69, at 69-106. 
257. See Jessop, supra note 19.  
258. See supra notes 162-73 and accompanying text. 
259. See supra notes 195-214 and accompanying text. 
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are classically market-based as per Oliver Williamson’s institutional 
typology, i.e., comprised primarily of arm’s length transactions;260 
and some are more “networked” in their economic ordering.261  
Each different competitive logic demands a distinct focus of 
regulation: promoting price competition vs. promoting price 
competition,262 promoting dynamic efficiency vs. promoting static 
efficiency,263 and promoting efficient distribution of goods and 
resources vs. promoting fair distribution of goods and resources.264  
Thus, instead of having to promote a single competition-regulatory 
framework as per the monistic vision of competition that informs the 
orthodox model, competition regulation in Asian-capitalist systems 
will need to involve multiple regulatory models, even within a single, 
national jurisdiction. We might call this particular kind of regulatory 
structure “regulatory pluralism.”265 
An example of such regulatory pluralism in the context of Asian-
capitalist competition regulation is found in the Antimonopoly Law of 
the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”).266 Here, the law itself 
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260. See Williamson, supra note 176. 
261. See supra notes 174-93 and accompanying text. 
262. See, e.g., McEwin, supra note 61. 
263. See DeLong & Summers, supra note 1, at 34.  
264. See, e.g., PROSSER, supra note 24. 
265. This definition draws on some of the literature on “legal pluralism.” See Sally Engle 
Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 LAW & SOC. REV. 869 (1988); John Griffiths, What is Legal 
Pluralism? 24 J. LEGAL PLURALISM & UNOFFICIAL L. 1, 1 (1986). For an application of this 
regulatory approach to legal pluralism to Asia, see, e.g., Gillespie, supra note 176; see also 
Michael W. Dowdle, Asian Regionalism and Law: The Continuing Contribution of Legal 
Pluralism, in THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF ASIAN REGIONALISM 226 (Mark Beeson & 
Richard Stubbs eds., 2012). I use the term “regulatory pluralism” rather than legal pluralism so 
as to emphasize that a regulatory space is often “regulated” by more than just law. See also 
supra notes 120-25 and accompanying text. Similar structurings of regulatory space have been 
identified independently by Andrew Dunsire, Colin Scott, and Nicole Roughan. See Andrew 
Dunsire, Manipulating Social Tensions: Collibration as an Alternative Mode of Government 
Intervention (Max-Plank Institut fuer Gesellschaftsforschung, MPIG Discussion Paper No. 
93/7, 1993), available at http://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/43732/1/152565922.pdf 
(discussing what he calls ‘collibration’); Colin Scott, Regulating Everything: From Mega- to 
Meta-regulation, 60 ADMINISTRATION 61 (2012) (discussing what he calls ‘meta-regulation’); 
NICOLE ROUGHAN, AUTHORITIES: CONFLICTS, COOPERATION, AND TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL 
THEORY (2013). 
266. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Fanlongduan Fa (2007) (effective Aug. 1, 2008), 
available at http://www.gov.cn/flfg/2007-08/30/content_732591.htm; unofficial English 
translation available at http://www.omm.com/files/upload/ 
Bush_Chinese_Antitrust_ActII_Scene1_ABA_Antitrust_Source_Oct_2008.pdf. See generally 
Wentong Zheng, State Capitalism and the Regulation of Competition in China, in ASIAN 
CAPITALISM AND THE REGULATION OF COMPETITION: TOWARDS A REGULATORY 
GEOGRAPHY OF GLOBAL COMPETITION LAW 114 (Michael W. Dowdle et al. eds., 2013). 
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expressly recognizes two different capitalist models operating 
simultaneously in the PRC economy. These are sometimes called the 
“private economy,” arguably a variant of CME capitalism, and the 
state-run economy, a form of state capitalism.267 The law then applies 
a different model of competition regulation to each.268 This is in stark 
contrast to the orthodox competition laws of the North Atlantic, in 
which recognize only one mode of competition, and hence only one 
normative model for regulating it, with other forms of capitalist 
competition being defined simply as exceptions rather than as true 
alternative competitive-capitalist systems in their own right.269 
But the PRC competition-regulatory framework is not simply 
pluralist along statutory lines. It is also pluralist along a spatial lines. 
China’s size is such that it encompasses both relatively core and 
relatively peripheral economic zones within its territory. And as 
discussed above, peripheral economies operate according to a distinct 
capitalist logic, and thus require distinct capitalist-regulatory regimes. 
The melamine milk adulteration crisis of the 2008 is a good 
demonstration of this.270 That crisis was caused in significant part by 
China seeking to impose a singular, monocratic regulatory framework 
over the whole of China’s dairy industry, when in fact that framework 
was very ill-suited to the actual economic conditions of the peripheral 
economies that supplied most of that industry’s raw milk.271 It was 
through this regulatory disconnect that the crisis unfolded, a point that 
is demonstrated by the fact that the crisis only affected national dairy 
companies—and did not impact local and regional dairy firms located 
and serving more peripheral regions, which were locally regulated in 
accordance with locally distinct regulatory norms and frameworks.272 
Another example of a pluralist regulatory regime for competition 
regulation can be found in John Gillespie’s recent study of market 
competition in Vietnam, describe above. In that study, as we saw, he 
identifies three distinct forms of capitalism operating in Vietnam, 
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267. See Robert Boyer, How the Specificity of Chinese Capitalism Explains its Position 
in the World Economy (2013), http://robertboyer.org/?p=58 (English translation of Robert 
Boyer, Cómo explica la especificidad del capitalismo Chino su posición en la economía, 4 
VOCES EN EL FENIX 10 (2013)); see also Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 196. 
268. See Prosser, supra note 9, at 250-52; Zheng, supra note 266, at 162-63; cf. MARK 
FURSE, ANTITRUST LAW IN CHINA, KOREA AND VIETNAM 69 (2009). 
269. See infra notes 120-23 and accompanying text. 
270. See generally Dowdle, supra note 51. 
271. See id. at 219-22. 
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each with its own way of structuring market competition.273 In 
contrast to China, the diversity of capitalisms found in Vietnam, 
which corresponds to different class-based networks. They are not 
codified in Vietnam’s Competition Law,274 but they are nevertheless 
accepted by soft law norms that the state itself tacitly endorses.275 
Japan presents us with yet another example of regulatory 
pluralism, one that manifests itself temporally rather than sectorally or 
geographically.276 Japan has had an American inspired—some would 
say “imposed”—competition law on the books since the late 1940s.277 
But its actual engagement with that law has been ambivalent. Despite 
the best efforts of US post-War rebuilders to rid Japan of its pre-war, 
corporatist-economic reliance on industrial cartels called zaibatsu, 
postwar Japan retained significant elements of its prewar corporatism, 
with keiretsu taking over the corporatist-economic functionality of the 
zaibatsu.278  
At the same time as the Japanese Fair Trade Commission 
(“JFTC”) was looking to construct Japan’s positivist market-
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273. See Gillespie, supra note 151. Gillespie identifies these three distinct forms of 
capitalism as “cadre-capitalism,” which is organized around former governmental officials, 
“LME networks,” which emerged among large and medium scale enterprises and SME 
networks, which emerge among small and medium scale enterprises. See id. at 177-85. 
274. Competition Law, No. 27/2004/QH11 (2004) (effective July 1, 2005) (Viet.) 
(English translation available at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=184460). 
275. See also Painter, supra note 192, at 38-39:  
There is a powerful domestic structural and political logic to the pace and trajectory 
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embedded in the structure of the Vietnamese state, and help to sustain both the 
bureaucracy and the party . . . . On the one hand, the delays and prevarications in the SOE 
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produce a more efficient set of economic enterprises. 
For a discussion of how competition regulatory regimes are comprised of both hard law and 
soft law norms, see Maher, The Institutional Structure, supra note 12; cf. COLLINS, supra note 
124 (describing mixture of hard and soft law systems that make up English contract 
regulation). 
276. See generally Vande Walle, supra note 250. Cf. ULRIKE SCHAEDE, COOPERATIVE 
CAPITALISM: SELF REGULATION, TRADE ASSOCIATIONS, AND THE ANTIMONOPOLY LAW IN 
JAPAN 69-108 (2000). 
277. See Shiteki dokusen no kinshi oyobi kǀsei torihiki no kakuho ni kan suru hǀritsu 
[Act on Prohibition of Private Monopolization and Maintenance of Fair Trade], Law No. 54 of 
1947 (Japan). 
278. See Vande Walle, supra note 250, at 140; see also HIROSHI IYORI & AKINORI 
UESUGI, THE ANTIMONOPOLY LAWS AND POLICIES OF JAPAN (1994); supra notes 186-87 and 
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competition regulation along firmly orthodox lines, Japan’s Ministry 
of International Trade and Industry (“MITI”) was using 
administrative guidance279 to develop an alternative regulatory 
structure that served the needs of the continuing corporatist part of the 
Japan’s post-war economy.280 For the remainder of the twentieth 
century, Japan’s national competition policy would oscillate between 
MITI’s corporatist regulatory framework and the JFTC’s orthodox 
framework.281  But throughout this period, both regulatory 
frameworks continued to co-exist in the same regulatory space, albeit 
in a sometimes dominant, and sometimes subaltern, capacity.282 In 
this way, Japan’s policy oscillations represented a political shifting of 
emphasis, and never the triumph of a form of capitalism, or one form 
of competition regulation, over the other.283 
B. Regulating Regulatory Pluralism: “Political Regulation” 
Regulatory pluralism is inapposite to the presumptions and 
prescriptions of the orthodox model. Put succinctly, the orthodox 
model treats the regulation of market competition as a technical—or, 
if one prefers, “technocratic”—concern: one that can and should be 
driven by objective pursuit of a singular, monistic vision of what 
constitutes proper market competition, i.e., perfect competition.284  
We might call this kind of regulation, “juristic regulation,” because its 
normative aspirations are the same as those that attach to judicial 
decision making, i.e., to identify an authoritatively “best answer” via 
deduction from a monistic set of first principles.285 
By contrast, in a pluralist regulatory environment, responses to 
regulatory issues cannot be deductively extrapolated from a monistic 
set of first principles. The pluralist nature of that environment means 
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279. See Mitsuo Matsushita, The Antimonopoly Law of Japan, in GLOBAL COMPETITION 
POLICY 151 (Edward Montgomery Graham & J. David Richardson eds., 1997); see also supra 
notes 190-91 and accompanying text (for a general description of administrative guidance). 
280. See also Vande Walle, supra note 250, at 126-31; Upham, supra note 189.  
281. See Vande Walle, supra note 250, at 131-43. 
282. See also SCHAEDE, supra note 276, at 69-108; Matsui, supra note 231. 
283. A similar dynamic has been observed in South Korea. See Prosser, supra note 9, at 
246-49; Kwon, supra note 250, at 20-28. 
284. See Jessop, supra note 19. 
285. Note that here we are merely describing the normative construction of (rational, 
Weberian) law. As many have noted, as a matter of actual practice, judicial judgments often 
deviate from these normative standards. Compare Ronald Dworkin, No Right Answer, 53 
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356 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 38:301 
that many regulatory responses will require a choice between 
competing but equally legitimate visions of capitalist market 
organization.286 Within the context of Asian capitalism, the 
consumerist needs of markets driven by domestic competitiveness 
often come into conflict with the producerist needs of markets driven 
by transnational competitiveness;287 the regulatory needs of national 
markets that deal in consumer goods often conflict with the needs of 
local markets that deal more in citizenship goods;288 and the dynamic 
needs of product-competitive markets and markets that focus on 
industrial upgrading often conflict with the regulatory needs of price 
competitive markets that are driven by pursuit of productive and 
allocative efficiency.289 Each of these forms of capitalisms serve an 
important social purpose—efficient use of resources and 
maximization of consumer welfare in the case of price competition 
and consumerism; industrial upgrading in the case of product 
competition and producerism; transnational integration and 
embeddedness in the case of transnational production chains; social 
security and stability in the case of citizenship goods. 
Moreover, these different social purposes are often 
incommensurate: one cannot use a redistribution of the social gains 
realized by favoring one market or one capitalism over others to 
offset the social losses—including the lost social opportunities—that 
accrue by not favoring some other competing capitalism or market.290 
The future opportunities gained by promoting “new economies”291 
cannot be used to compensate the present loss in social welfare 
caused by not promoting Fordist industrialism.292 Social welfare 
compensation via tax-and-redistribute schemes, for those who do not 
reap their fair share of the benefit from neoclassical markets, does not 
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compensate for the loss of autonomy and dignity that comes from 
exclusion from economic citizenship.293 
Because regulatory conflicts between markets can often involve 
tradeoffs between incommensurate social goods, when such conflicts 
arise, the regulatory choice as to which to prioritize cannot be settled 
juristically.294 Such conflicts can only be managed, they cannot be 
resolved.295 Put another way, in pluralist environments, the purpose of 
regulation cannot be to direct the community to a particular goal, such 
as perfect markets in the case of the orthodox theory, because no such 
singular goal exists. Rather, it must be more simply to maintain the 
integrity and coherence of the environment by maintaining a balance 
among these competing interests.296 
And as well described by John Dunn, maintaining such a balance 
is best done through politics—or what we might call, to contrast 
against juristic regulation, “political regulation”: 
What exactly is politics? It is, first of all, the struggles which 
result from the collisions between human purposes: most clearly 
when these collisions involve large numbers of human beings. 
But it is not, of course, only a matter of struggle. It takes in, too, 
the immense array of expedients and practices which human 
beings have invented to co-operate, as much as to compete, with 
one another in pursuing their purposes.297 
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of Betterness, 89 PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH 584 (2014); MICHAEL 
W. SPICER, IN DEFENSE OF POLITICS IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION: A VALUE PLURALIST 
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As many have noted, Asian capitalism does indeed show a 
strong preference for political rather than juristic modes for regulating 
market competition.298 The clearest demonstration of this is found in 
its resistance to the use of politically “independent” regulatory 
agencies (“IRAs”). The IRA model—also referred to as the 
“regulatory state”299—works to isolate regulatory agencies from 
political influences.300 It is a key component of the orthodox model, 
which as we will describe in more detail below, is extremely hostile 
to politics.301 
Asia resistance to “independent” regulators in the context of 
competition regulation has been well demonstrated in a recent study 
by Tony Prosser.302 Of the six jurisdictions he surveys—Singapore, 
Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea, China, and Vietnam303—only in 
Hong Kong is market competition regulated by a truly independent 
regulatory agency.304  Hong Kong is the exception that proves the rule 
in this case, however, because as a small, wholly-urbanized, and 
highly Fordist jurisdiction, Hong Kong’s economy is likely to be 
significantly less variegated and therefore significantly more 
amendable to monocratic regulation—via IRAs—that those of other 
Asian countries.  
Both South Korea and Taiwan have also recently set up formally 
formally independent competition authorities, i.e., the Korean Fair 
Trade Commission and Taiwan’s Fair Trade Commission, 
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Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social Choice Theory, Value Pluralism, and Democratic 
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298. See, e.g., Prosser, supra note 9; Liu, supra note 2. 
299. Giandomenico Majone, The Rise of the Regulatory State in Europe, 17 W. EUR. 
POL. 77 (1994). 
300. See Fabrizio Gilardi, The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Capitalism: The 
Diffusion of Independent Regulatory Agencies in Western Europe, 84 ANNALS OF THE. AM. 
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 598 (2005); Nicola Phillips, States and Modes of Regulation in the 
Global Political Economy, in REGULATORY GOVERNANCE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 17, 24 
(Martin Minogue & Ledivina V. Cariño eds., Edward Elgar, 2006). 
301. See Maher, The Institutional Structure, supra note 12, at 61-75. 
302. See generally Prosser, supra note 9. See also Liu, supra note 2. 
303. Prosser, supra note 9, at 238-53.  
304. See id. at 242-44. 
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respectively.305 But the actual political independence of these 
commissions is significantly compromised. In the case of South 
Korea, this is due to the fact that a considerable portion of the Korean 
economy, that which revolves around the state-supported chaebol, is 
not covered by Korea’s competition law, and thus lies outside the 
reach of Korea’s new, independent-regulatory framework.306 In the 
case of Taiwan, technocratic independence is weakened by a 
legislative provision requiring the Fair Trade Commission to consult 
other, non-politically-independent agencies or ministries whenever 
competition-regulatory issues arise that concern these agencies’ 
authority.307 The overall effect of this provision is to cause the 
technocratics of competition law to become mixed up with the politics 
of industrial policy.308 
Although not included in Prosser’s survey, Japan’s Fair Trade 
Commission (“JFTC”) also warrants discussion in this context. A 
creation of the American post-War occupation, the JFTC was set up 
as an independent regulatory agency.309 But as discussed above, the 
regulatory impact of the JFTC has been severely compromised by the 
fact that for considerable periods of time, the implementation of 
Japan’s competition law regime has been administered not by the 
JFTC, but by Japan’s Ministry of International Trade and Industry 
(“MITI”), which as its name indicates, is not a politically-independent 
agency. Moreover, the choice of how to balance the competing 
regulatory authorities of the JFTC vis-à-vis MITI has always itself 
been a highly political choice.310 Thus, despite having a nominally 
“independent” competition-regulatory system, Japan’s actual 
regulation of market competition paradoxically is actually emblematic 
of Asia’s distinctly politicized competition-regulatory model.311 
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37(3), 35(1), amended by Law No. 7315 Dec. 31, 2004 (S. Kor.). 
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Feb. 4, 1991, effective Feb. 4, 1992).  
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Going beyond Prosser’s survey, Indonesia also has established a 
formally independent IRA. But as with Taiwan, Japan, and South 
Korea, regulators there have chosen to promote a more politically-
regulated “fair competition” rather than the apolitical free competition 
advocated by the orthodox model.312 
All the other jurisdictions surveyed by Prosser—Singapore, 
China, and Vietnam—have rejected the IRA model in favor of more 
political forms of regulation.313 To this list, we might also add 
Thailand, which has a competition commission, but one that is not 
independent either in form or in practice.314 
C. Political Regulation vs. Regulatory Capture 
Of course, many criticize Asian capitalism precisely because of 
its general unwillingness to insulate competition regulation from 
politics.315  As noted in the introduction, the orthodox model is 
intensely hostile to politics.316 In a regulatory environment in which 
every regulatory issue is best resolved through technical application 
of the objective demands of perfect competition, all politics can do is 
introduce extraneous considerations that impede, and often corrupt, 
this kind of decision making.317 
The orthodox model’s fear of politics is most commonly 
expressed in terms of “regulatory capture.”318 “Regulatory capture” 
describes a condition in which the subject of a regulatory regime is 
able to gain political influence over a regulator, and uses that 
influence to cause the regulator to regulate so as to promote that 
subject’s private interests rather than the public interest. In the context 
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314. See Mark Williams, Competition Law in Thailand: Seeds of Success or Fated to 
Fail?, 27 WORLD COMPETITION 459 (2004). 
315. DAVID C. KANG, CRONY CAPITALISM: CORRUPTION AND DEVELOPMENT IN 
SOUTH KOREA AND THE PHILIPPINES (2002); see, e.g., Robert Ian McEwin, Business, Politics 
and Competition Law in Southeast Asia, in 2 WILLIAM E KOVACIC: AN ANTITRUST TRIBUTE, 
LIBER AMICORUM  217 (Nicolas Charbit  & Elisa Ramundo eds., 2014).  
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GER. L.J. 527 (2013). 
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318. See George Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. 
SCI. 3 (1971); see also Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, The Politics of Government 
Decision Making: A Theory of Regulatory Capture, 106 Q. J. ECON. 1089 (1991). In the 
context of completion law, see Maher, The Institutional Structure, supra note 12, at 62. 
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of competition regulation, the capturing firm or industry will use this 
influence to cause the regulator to impede market competition, 
generally by restricting market entry by new firms, thereby allowing 
the capturing firm or industry to enjoy monopoly-like rents at a cost 
to the social welfare of society as a whole.319 
Of course, fear of regulatory capture makes perfect sense in a 
competitive-regulatory regime governed by a monistic 
conceptualization of what kind of market capitalism should constitute 
the national economy.320 But as we have seen, under Asian capitalism, 
the capitalisms at play are variegated rather than monistic, and the 
regulatory framework is—incommensurately—pluralist. Conflicts 
have to be balanced and negotiated rather than resolved and 
harmonized. How does the phenomenon of regulatory capture play 
out in this kind of regulatory environment? 
In fact, in such an environment, regulatory capture is not 
necessarily that bad of a thing—it can even be an important 
component of political-regulatory effectiveness.321 In order to see why 
this is so, we have to unpack the dynamics of regulatory capture a bit. 
The variegated nature of Asian capitalism works to “fragment” 
economic regulatory environments. A fragmented regulatory 
environment is one in which there are multiple regulators performing 
the same function, or in which a single regulator requires the 
coordination of multiple regulators in order to be effective.322 In 
fragmented environments, capture of a particular regulator does not 
have as great an effect on the overall pattern of regulation, because 
capture of any particular regulator does not result in capture of the 
system as a whole.  
Moreover, in fragmented regulatory environments, some 
particular kinds of patterns of regulatory capture can actually promote 
rather than impede competition, by offering multiple and competing 
channels for market entry. A striking example of this in the context of 
Asian competition regulation is found in Richard Doner and Amsil 
Ramsey’s study of competition and competition regulation in the 
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Thailand textile industry.323 Paradoxically when compared to the 
orthodox theory, they found that the highly fragmented nature of 
Thailand’s regulatory environment—one in which “[e]ssential 
government goods, such as permits to open factories, could ‘be 
supplied by at least two government agencies”324—actually worked to 
promote rather than inhibit market competition. This was because it 
caused different government agencies to compete for capture by 
offering parallel regulatory services, which in turn facilitated market 
entry:  
[F]ragmented political patrons eager to obtain extra-bureaucratic 
funds helped to facilitate a constant flow of new private sector 
claimants’ access to markets. Put simply, an aspiring 
entrepreneur could nearly always find a patron.325 
In fact, Doner and Ramsey credit the Thai textile industry’s 
particular structure and pattern of regulatory capture with “enabling 
Thailand to overcome collective action problems that hampered 
sustained economic growth in many other less developed 
countries.”326 Capture made industry dependent on the captured 
regulator, which resulted in “various public, private and mixed 
public-private institutional arrangements”327 that promoted industry 
flexibility, responsiveness, and competitiveness in export markets.328 
Similar dynamics have also been observed in Thailand’s rice and 
automotive parts industries.329 
A comparable observation about how fragmented regulatory 
capture can promote rather than impede competition and 
competitiveness, this time in China, has been made by Gabriella 
Montinola, Yingyi Qian, and Barry R. Weingast, in their study of 
“Federalism, Chinese Style.”330 Here, the fragmented capture is in the 
form of local industrial capture of local government, resulting in a 
highly fragmented pattern of local economic protectionism. Similar to 
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the dynamic observed in Thailand, this fragmentation “induce[d] 
competition among local governments, serving both to constrain their 
behavior and to provide them with a range of positive incentives to 
foster local economic prosperity.”331 
Montinola et al.’s observations about the positive effects of local 
regulatory capture in China’s economic regulation parallels the 
finding of a more recent study by Angela Zhang on the administration 
of China’s competition law regime. Here, the competing captures are 
bureaucratically fragmented (similar to that described above 
regarding the Thai textile industry discussed above) rather than 
regionally fragmented, but the ultimate effect is generally the same: 
Chinese ministries are organized by either function (e.g., 
education, culture, finance) or economic sector (e.g., agriculture, 
telecommunication, transportation). This complex structure gives 
virtual (i.e., nonelectoral) representation to all those economic 
groups and interests on whom the CCP leadership depends for 
political support. It also provides some checks and balances 
among the agencies. As each of them has particular missions, 
they are expected to pursue them with zeal. Therefore, when 
ministries and provincial leaders are called together to discuss a 
policy proposal, they are expected to represent and articulate the 
views of their units.332 
Later on, she concludes: 
The endless struggle among these government actors for control 
of policy therefore accounts for the heterogeneity of China’s 
seemingly paradoxical antitrust enforcement outcome. As 
illustrated in consensus building in merger enforcement, the 
incorporation of industrial policy into merger decisions is in fact 
the result of a protracted process that involves intense negotiation 
and bargaining between [the Ministry of Finance and Commerce] 
and the other government agencies who have a say in [Anti-
Monopoly Law] enforcement.333 
Simon Vande Walle’s historical study of competition regulation 
in Japan shows a similarly fragmented pattern of regulatory capture, 
wherein different political interests capture different regulatory 
agencies—the Japan Fair Trade Commission vs. the Ministry of 
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International Trade and Industry—within a larger regulatory 
environment in which these and other agencies compete for 
regulatory authority.334 In the context of this higher-level competition, 
regulatory capture tends to be short-term rather than long-term, as the 
center of regulatory gravity has consistently oscillated over the years 
between the JFTC and MITI.335 A recent study by Tony Prosser 
suggests a similarly bureaucratically-fragmented pattern of 
competitive-regulatory capture operates in South Korea.336 
John Gillespie’s study of variegated market competition in 
Vietnam also shows a regulatory environment in which a diversity of 
regulatory captures appears to operate in homeostatic balance. 
Although here, the balance appears to be maintained through mutual 
regulatory indifference rather than through more proactive inter-
regulatory negotiation337—something that more resembles “legal 
pluralism”, i.e., the simultaneous existence of multiple legal systems 
within a particular jurisdictional space that operate autonomously 
from one another338—rather than the more actively negotiated 
political pluralism described in the countries discussed above. 
All in all, the particular form of competition-regulatory 
fragmentation caused by Asian capitalism is consistent with the 
particular forms of regulatory capture that do not impede, and 
sometimes promote, market functionality.339 We might note, along 
these lines, that the original critique of regulatory capture addressed 
itself to regulatory capture in the context of North Atlantic 
capitalisms. As that critique saw it, the principal problem with 
regulatory capture was not that it allows private interests to shield 
themselves from market competition per se, but that it allows 
particular classes of private interests—those that had relative 
advantage in overcoming collective action problems—to shield 
themselves from regulatory competition with other kinds of public 
interests that have greater difficultly overcoming such collective-
action problems. Most critically insofar as the consumerist 
capitalisms of the North Atlantic are concerned, it was seen as 
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allowing producer interests to shield themselves from regulatory 
competition with consumer interests.340  But as we have seen, Asian 
capitalism is distinctly producerist as opposed to consumerist in its 
orientation. This would suggest that the negative consequences of 
regulatory capture would be much less of an issue.  
The implications of regulatory capture are made even more 
ambiguous by the incommensurate nature of Asia’s pluralist 
capitalisms341 and the fact that there is often no “right answer” to 
regulatory conflict. Here, as noted by Angela Huang in the quoted 
passage above,342 fragmented patterns of regulatory captures actually 
come to resemble political representation. Parliaments, for example, 
can be regarded as bodies whose representative character is generated 
by a large number of bureaucratically fragmented regulatory captures, 
i.e., the individual geographic constituencies’ “capture” of their 
particular members of parliament. James Madison’s theory of 
federalism could also be characterized in this way—federalism being 
a form of government that works by allowing different levels of 
government—local and national—to be captured by different kinds of 
political interests—a political variant of the ‘Chinese style federalism’ 
described by Montinola et al.343 Montesquieu’s particular vision of 
separation of powers, which anticipated that the executive, legislature, 
and courts would be captured by different classes of society, i.e., the 
monarchy, nobility, and commoner, respectively, can also be seen in 
this light.344 In an English-style parliamentary democracy, the 
representative character of the constitutional order comes from the 
temporary factional capture of government brought about by 
elections, a point brought home by the common characterization of 
England’s constitutional structure as an “elective dictatorship.”345 
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In incommensurately pluralist regulatory environments, 
fragmented patterns of regulatory captures are in fact not only 
consistent with processes of what we are calling political regulation, 
but can even be constitutive of it.346 For example, in their 1992 study 
of “responsive regulation,” Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite present 
econometric demonstration not only of how regulatory capture can 
sometimes be economically efficient,347 but how the best solution to 
inefficient regulatory capture can often be to encourage more capture 
by a greater diversity of interests.348 The findings of a recent study 
overseen by Navroz Dubash and Bronwen Morgan of market 
regulation in selected developing countries in Asia and Latin America 
comports with the dynamic described by Ayres and Braithwaite. 
Consistent with the argument above, Dubash and Morgan see their 
findings as calling for “[a] reframed intellectual agenda that is more 
accepting of limited degrees of politicization and more honest—or 
modest perhaps—about its capacity to provide generalized solutions 
and the level of principle.”349 All this argues that in the context of a 
pluralist regulatory environment such as that of Asian competition 
regulation, an environment that ultimately has to be regulated via 
political rather than simply juristic forms of regulation, contrary to the 
claims of the orthodox model, regulatory capture could be a feature 
rather than a bug.  
This is not to suggest that political regulation always works. 
Even in regulatory environments in which it is called for, a particular 
political-regulatory system can operate dysfunctionally. In order to be 
functional, a political regulatory system, like all regulatory systems, 
requires or benefits from the presence of appropriate organizational 
structures.350 The point here is that insofar as regulating competition 
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within variegated capitalism is concerned, this is what we need to be 
focusing our attention on—whether the (inevitably) political 
regulatory system that governs market competition is effective; and if 
not—why not?  
But we cannot begin to respond to this particular problem if we 
presume, as per the orthodox model, that competition regulation must 
be isolated and immunized from politics. Recognizing that under 
conditions of Asian capitalism, competition regulation can ultimately 
only be politically regulated reminds us that it is ultimately in the 
details of its political embeddedness, and not simply in its economic 
expertise, that the effectiveness of Asia’s variegated competition-
regulatory systems ultimately lie. 
IV. IS ASIAN CAPITALISM AND THE ‘POLITICAL’ REGULATION 
OF MARKET COMPETITION REALLY SO UNIQUE? 
We have been describing Asian capitalism by comparing and 
contrasting it against what we have been calling North Atlantic 
capitalisms, reflecting the fact that the orthodox model regards North 
Atlantic capitalism as ordinary and Asian capitalism, to the extent it 
deviates from the presumptions of that model, as exceptional. But is 
there really any reason for assuming this? When Jamie Peck and Nik 
Theodore first proposed their idea of variegated capitalism, they 
actually did so in the context of North Atlantic economies.351 As we 
shall see herein, there is good reason to suspect that it is the 
capitalism described by the orthodox model, not Asian capitalism, 
that is the exception.352 And this being the case, it also suggests that 
Asia’s political regulation of market competition is not something that 
is or should be distinct to Asia. It is the political regulation of 
competition evinced in Asian capitalism, and not the technical 
regulation proposed by the orthodox model, that should be regarded 
as the norm. 
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A. Capitalist Variegation Within and Among North Atlantic 
Economies 
Variegated capitalism is not unique to Asia. As we shall see, 
North Atlantic capitalisms show many of the same dimensions of 
variegation as Asian capitalism, including core-periphery ordering, 
variations between price-competitive and product-competitive 
economies, disaggregated production, a hollowing out and 
fragmentation of domestic regulatory space, and the deployment of a 
variety of state capitalisms. 
North Atlantic capitalisms evince the same core-periphery 
ordering as Asian capitalism.353 As with Asian capitalism, more 
peripheral regions in the North Atlantic are more reliant on exports. 
But since the national economies of the North Atlantic overall are 
more consumption-oriented,354 this suggests that along this particular 
dimension, core-periphery orderings within national economic space 
might actually generate even greater capitalist variegation within 
North Atlantic countries than it does within Asian countries.355  
Also as in Asian economies, production in North Atlantic 
economies is becoming increasingly disaggregated, although North 
Atlantic disaggregation tends to be structured using contractual 
relationships rather than by using network relationships.356 Because of 
this, North Atlantic economies are also experiencing a “hollowing-
out” of the state similar to that experienced by Asian economies.357 
Indeed, like that of variegated capitalism, the notion of the 
“hollowing-out of the state” was initially developed to describe the 
regulatory evolution of European states.358 In fact, this hollowing may 
be even more pronounced in Europe than in Asia due to the European 
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at the W. G. Hart Legal Workshop 2006, June 27-29, 2006), available at http://
eprints.lancs.ac.uk/232/1/Reg_Networks_%26_Glob_Gov.pdf?origin=publication_detail; R. 
A. W. Rhodes, The Hollowing Out of the State: The Changing Nature of the Public Service in 
Britain, 65 POL. Q. 138 (1994); Bob Jessop, Towards a Schumpeterian Workfare state? 
Preliminary Remarks on Post-Fordist Political Economy, 40 STUD. POL. ECON. 7, 10, 22-25 
(1993). 
358.  See Jessop, supra note 357, at 10, 22-25; R. A. W. Rhodes, supra note 357. 
2015] PUBLIC-LAW CHARACTER OF COMPETITION LAW 369 
state’s greater embeddedness in the transnational regulatory system of 
the European Union.359 
As noted above, North Atlantic capitalism also relies heavily on 
promoting competitiveness in product-competitive markets, 
particularly in core industrial sectors,360 as well described by Joseph 
Schumpeter: 
[In core industries,] it is not [price] competition which counts but 
the competition from the new commodity, the new technology, 
the new source of supply, the new type of organization (the 
largest-scale unit of control, for instance) — competition which 
commands a decisive cost or quality advantage and which strikes 
not at the margins of the profits and the outputs of the existing 
firms but at their foundations and their very lives. This kind of 
competition . . . [is] so much important that it becomes a matter 
of comparative indifference whether competition in the ordinary 
sense functions more or less promptly; the powerful lever that in 
the long run expands output and brings down prices is in any case 
made of other stuff.361 
Finally, North Atlantic economies also frequently construct 
state-capitalist capitalisms to address particular national or social 
goals.362 Examples include various welfare capitalisms to promote 
social security and stability;363 solidarity capitalisms to promote social 
citizenship;364 and public-private partnerships and other kinds of 

359. Cf. Bob Jessop, Hollowing out the “Nation-State” and Multi-level Governance, in 
A HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE SOCIAL POLICY 11 (Patricia Kennett ed., 2d ed. 2013). 
360. See supra notes 57-62 and accompanying text. 
361. SCHUMPETER, supra note 58, at 84-85. 
362. See REICH, supra note 110, at 43-57. 
363. See, e.g., Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union art. 106(3), 2008 OJ C 115/91; Treaty of Lisbon, art. 1-2 of Protocol on Services of 
General Interest, 2007 OJ C 306/158 (providing antitrust exceptions for ‘services of general 
economic interest’). See generally Colin Scott, Services of General Interest in EC Law: 
Matching Values to Regulatory Technique in the Public and Privatised Sectors, 6 EUR. L. J. 
310 (2000). 
364. See Sodemare and Others v. Regione Lombardia (Case C-70/95) [1997] ECR I-
3395, 3409-11¶29 (discussing solidarity rights); see also British United Provident Assoc. Ltd. 
(BUPA) and Others v. Commission (Case T-289/03) [2008] ECR II-81; Federación Española 
de Empresas de Tecnología Sanitaria (FENIN) v. Commission of the European Communities 
[2006] ECR I-6295. See generally Tony Prosser, Competition Law and Public Services: From 
Single Market to Citizenship Rights?, 11 EUR. PUB. L. 543 (2005). 
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state-market hybrids whose purpose is to promote national industrial 
competitiveness.365 
As discussed above, North Atlantic capitalisms handle 
variegation by doctrinally removing these alternatively structured 
markets from orthodox competition law and locating them in other 
doctrinal frameworks, such as intellectual property366 or “services of 
general economic interest,”367 or via ad hoc statutory or judicial 
exceptions such as those for labor markets368 or, in the case in the 
United States, for professional baseball.369 But what happens when 
these regulatory exceptions end up swallowing the rule? As Joseph 
Schumpeter famously wrote: 
[P]erfect competition is the exception and . . . even if it were the 
rule there would be much less reason for congratulations than one 
might think. If we look more closely at the conditions . . . that 
must be fulfilled in order to produce perfect competition, we 
realize immediately that outside of agricultural mass production 
there cannot be many instances of it.370 
When the exceptions are so great as to swallow the rule, they really 
aren’t “exceptions”—they are alternatives. Recognizing them as 

365. See, e.g., White House [US], Cyberspace Policy Review: Assuring a Trusted and 
Resilient Information and Communications Infrastructure 18-19 (2009), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/Cyberspace_Policy_Review_final.pdf.: 
Some members of the private sector continue to express concern that certain federal 
laws might impede full collaborative partnerships and operational information sharing 
between the private sector and government. For example, some in industry are concerned 
that the information sharing and collective planning that occurs among members of the 
same sector under existing partnership models might be viewed as “collusive” or contrary 
to laws forbidding restraints on trade. 
. . .  
As part of the partnership, government should work creatively and collaboratively 
with the private sector to identify tailored solutions that take into account both the need to 
exchange information and protect public and private interests and take an integrated 
approach to national and economic security.  
See also Albert N. Link & John T. Scott, Public/Private Partnerships: Stimulating 
Competition in a Dynamic Market, 19 INT’L J. IND. ORG. 763 (2001); Tony Bovaird, Public-
Private Partnerships: From Contested Concepts to Prevalent Practice, 70 INT’L REV. ADMIN. 
SCI. 199 (2004). See generally MARIANA MAZZUCATO, THE ENTREPRENEURIAL STATE: 
DEBUNKING PUBLIC VS. PRIVATE SECTOR MYTHS (2013); ERIK S. REINERT, HOW RICH 
COUNTRIES GOT RICH AND WHY POOR COUNTRIES STAY POOR (2008). 
366. See supra note 61. 
367. See supra note 82. 
368. See supra notes 78-821 and accompanying text. 
369. See Toolson v. New York Yankees, 346 U.S. 356, 357 (1953); Fed. Baseball Club 
v. Nat’l League, 259 U.S. 200, 209 (1922). 
370. SCHUMPETER, supra note 58, at 78-79. 
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alternatives allows us to see that even in the North Atlantic, 
capitalism is actually much more variegated than recognized by the 
orthodox model.  
And bear in mind, Schumpeter wrote this in the heyday of 
Fordism. As Lawrence Summers and Brad DeLong have recently 
noted, such variegation appears to be getting more pronounced in the 
“new economy” of today’s post-Fordist world: 
[I]f we call the economy of the past two centuries 
primarily “Smithian,” the economy of the future is likely to be 
primarily “Schumpeterian.” In a “Smithian” economy, the 
decentralized market economy does a magnificent job (if the 
initial distribution of wealth is satisfactory) at producing 
economic welfare . . . . The competitive paradigm is appropriate 
as a framework to think about issues of microeconomic policy 
and regulation.  
In a “Schumpeterian” economy, the decentralized 
economy does a much less good job. Goods are produced under 
conditions of substantial increasing returns to scale. This means 
that competitive equilibrium is not a likely outcome: The 
canonical situation is more likely to be one of natural 
monopoly. . . . [I]t is clear that the competitive paradigm cannot 
be fully appropriate.371 
B. On the Ultimately Political Character of Competition Regulation 
in the North Atlantic 
As discussed above, variegated capitalism requires political 
rather than juristic or technical regulation.372 And contrary to the 
protestations of the orthodox model,373 North Atlantic competition 

371. See DeLong & Summers, supra note 1, at 33-34; see also ROGER L. CONKLING, 
MARGINAL COST IN THE NEW ECONOMY: A PROPOSAL FOR A UNIFORM APPROACH TO 
POLICY EVALUATIONS 3-23 (2004). 
372. See supra notes 284-314. 
373. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 42, at 428; Louis Kaplow, On the Choice of Welfare 
Standards in Competition Law, in THE GOALS OF COMPETITION LAW 3 (Daniel Zimmer ed., 
2012); R. Shyam Khemani, Competition Policy and Economic Development, POLICY OPTIONS 
23, 26-27 (October 1997); Kenneth G. Elzinga, The Goals of Antitrust: Other Than 
Competition and Efficiency, What Else Counts?, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1191 (1977); cf. Kaplow 
& Shavell, supra note 77, at 967: 
[L]egal rules should be selected entirely with respect to their effects on the well-being of 
individual in society . . . . [N]otions of fairness . . . should receive no independent weight 
in the assessment of legal rules. 
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regulation is permeated with political balancing of competing and 
often non-economic concerns and interests. As noted by former EU 
Competition Commissioner Karel Van Miert in the context of Europe: 
The aims of the European Community’s competition policy are 
[economic, political and social]. The policy is concerned not only 
with promoting efficient production but also achieving the aims 
of the European treaties: establishing a common market, 
approximating economic policies, promoting harmonious growth, 
raising living standards, bringing Member States closer together, 
etc. To this must be added the need to safeguard a pluralistic 
democracy, which could not survive a strong concentration of 
economic power. If competition policy is to reach these various 
goals, decisions must be made in a pragmatic fashion, bearing in 
mind the context in which they are to be made: the realization of 
the internal market, the globalization of markets, economic crisis, 
technological development, the ratification of the Maastricht 
treaty, etc.374 
Such an emphasis on the need for a pragmatic rather than 
technical or juristic balancing of these interests is precisely the stuff 
of political regulation.375And it is not unique to Europe. In the United 
States, political regulation of competition has been used to effectuate 
“income redistribution, protection of small business [and] local 
control of business.”376 Correspondingly, it is also subject to 
significant political regulation—manifested, for example, in 
continuous changes in executive enforcement policy, as described in a 
recent article by Eleanor Fox: 
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This exclusion of fairness from competition law concerns was not always the orthodox 
position. Historically, competition regulation in both the United States and Europe did in fact 
regard issues of equality and fairness as appropriate competition regulation concerns. See id.;  
David J. Gerber, Fairness in Competition Law: European and U.S. Experience 4-5 (paper 
presented at the Conference on Fairness and Asian Competition Laws, Kyoto, Japan, Mar. 5, 
2004), available at http://www.kyotogakuen.ac.jp/o_ied/information/
fairness_in_competition_law.pdf; see also Eleanor Fox, The Modernization of Antitrust: A 
New Equilibrium, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 1140, 1146-52 (1991). 
374. Karel Van Miert, A Pragmatic Approach to Europe’s Competition Policy, in 
FRONTIER-FREE EUR. MONTHLY NEWSL (Apr. 5, 1993), as quoted in Brian A. Facey & Dany 
H. Assaf, Monopolization and Abuse of Dominance in Canada, the United States, and the 
European Union: A Survey, 70 ANTITRUST L.J.  513, 527 (2002) (emphasis added); see also 
Eleanor Fox, US and EU Competition Law: A Comparison, in GLOBAL COMPETITION POLICY 
339, 334-39 (Edward Montgomery Graham & J. David Richardson eds., 1997). 
375. See supra note 297 and accompanying text.  
376. Terry Calvani, What is the Objective of Antitrust?, in ECON. ANALYSIS AND 
ANTITRUST L. 1, 7 (Terry Calvani & John Siegfried eds., 2d ed. 1988). See generally id. at 7-
13. 
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While [competition law enforcement regimes in the United State 
and Europe] both are affected by politics, in the United States 
enforcement is more likely to be influenced by the political 
philosophy current in the administration rather than direct 
interference in particular cases.377 
Consistent with the balancing character of political regulation,378 
William Kovacic attributes the political dynamic described by Fox to 
“‘equilibrating tendencies’ by which forces inside and outside the 
antitrust agencies motivate and moderate changes in the content of US 
competition policy.”379 
Interestingly, the need for pragmatic, prudential “political” 
regulation of competition has also been acknowledged in other parts 
of the world as well. Discussing competition law in Latin America, 
Julián Peña notes: 
The protection of competition is an objective that can be assessed 
by different governments along with the other policy objectives 
and should determine the level of priority considering the needs 
of each particular jurisdiction in each particular time. Therefore, 
since competition policy is just one of the instruments that 
governments have to implement their economic policy, it is very 
common in developing countries (such as Latin America) to find 
governments that relegate competition enforcement with respect 
to other priorities such as protecting labor, fighting inflation, 
combating poverty or attracting foreign investments.380 
All in all, the innately variegated nature of capitalism seems to 
have produced a markedly political form of competition regulation in 
Europe, in the United States, and in Latin America, just as it has in 
Asia. It is just that the orthodox model obscures this, due to the North 
Atlantic’s preference for framing alternative capitalisms as technical 
and doctrinal exceptions to the universal law, and then 
correspondingly locating the political balancing that must take place 
between these diverse capitalisms in the more opaque policymaking 
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377. Fox, supra note 374, at 353; see also MAHER M. DABBAH, INTERNATIONAL AND 
COMPARATIVE COMPETITION LAW 256 (2010) (“Politics in the field of competition law in the 
USA does play a major role: whether in the legislative process or enforcement actions . . . .”). 
378. See supra note 297 and accompanying text. 
379. William E. Kovacic, The Modern Evolution of U.S. Competition Policy 
Enforcement Norms, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 377, 403 (2003).  
380. Peña, supra note 9, at 243. 
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spaces of politically “independent” courts381 and administrative 
agencies, rather than in open political deliberation.382 But politics 
works best in the sunlight.383 It is therefore the political Asian model, 
not the artificially homogenized, orthodox model of the North 
Atlantic, that should be the principal model for our conceptualizations 
of competition law as a global phenomenon. 
V. THE LESSON OF ASIAN CAPITALISM: COMPETITION LAW AS 
PUBLIC LAW 
There is a fundamental tension within competition law that 
is linked to opposing theoretical bases. One emphasises its 
roots in private law and the other takes a more 
constitutional orientation.384 
 
Competition law is not just about market regulation. It is not just 
about promoting consumer or social welfare. It is, at the end of the 
day, about the construction of the state itself.  
It is, in other words, a form of public law. Public law can be 
defined as the law that governs the governing of the state.385 Trite and 
vague as this definition might be,386 it still allows us to identify its 
two defining aspects—one regulatory, the other constitutive. In its 
regulatory aspect, public law governs how and when the state may 
deploy its coercive might. In its constitutive aspect, public law also 
brings the state into being, i.e., defines it, delineates it, and gives it its 
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381. Cf. RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 109 (2010) (describing the process 
of judicial decisionmaking as “often and inevitably opaque”). 
382. Cf. Fox, supra note 374, at 353-54 (noting that in the United States politics in the 
enforcement of competition law resides primarily in administrative decision-making). 
383. Cf. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 
62 (Cosimo, 2009) [1914] (“Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and 
industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most 
efficient policeman.”). 
384. Imelda Maher, Regulating Competition, in REGULATING LAW 187, 189 (Christine 
Parker, Colin Scott, Nicola Lacey & John Braithwaite eds., 2004). 
385. See Loughlin, supra note 297, at 153 (“[t]he claim that public law is special rests on 
the singular character of its object—the activity of governing”). This is a somewhat different 
characterization than that used by civil law systems, which commonly define public law as the 
law that governs the relationship between citizens and the state. But these two definitions are 
largely coterminous. 
386. Id. (“[t]his may sound trite . . . .”). 
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coherence as a social construct. As we shall see, competition law is 
intimately involved in both of these projects.387 
A. Regulating the State 
As vague and conflicted as our understanding is of “the state”, 
that notion still plays a critical and irreplaceable role in our social 
construction of political society.388 The state is irrevocably linked to 
something that is often called “the public good.”389 Even as a simple 
placeholder word, “the state” allows us to identify those issues and 
phenomena that have claimed to be critical to our commonweal, to the 
public good, however we choose to define it.390 
Of course, governing the governing of the state is different from 
simply providing for the public good. It is the governing of how the 
state is to provide for the public good. The state, in providing that 
good, must nevertheless balance such provision against competing 
concerns.391 This balancing has two dimensions. First, provision of 
the public or collective good frequently comes into conflict with, and 
must therefore be balanced against, countervailing political-moral 
demands for some level of individual autonomy.392 Second, within 
any given society, there will inevitably be multiple, equally 
legitimate, understandings of what the “public good”.  Inevitably 
these understandings will sometimes conflict, and must therefore be 
balanced against one another.393 Thus, in saying that public law 
governs the governing of the state, what we are really saying is not 
that public law governs the provision of the public good, but that 
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387. Although using a different vocabulary, and approaching from a different tack, I 
believe that the framework for understanding public law presented in this article parallels that 
developed by Martin Loughlin in his FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC LAW (2010). See id. at 157-82 
(describing public law as ‘political jurisprudence’). For an analysis of how other aspects of 
economic regulation are better viewed as a form of public law, see TONY PROSSER, THE 
ECONOMIC CONSTITUTION 1-57 (2014). 
388. See MICHAEL FOUCAULT, SECURITY, TERRITORY, POPULATION: LECTURES AT THE 
COLLÈGE DE FRANCE, 1977-78, at 286-87 (Michael Senellart ed., Graham Butchell trans., 
2007); see also LOUGHLIN, supra note 387, at 205-08. 
389. Cf. “Alus populi suprema lex esto [the health of the people should be the supreme 
law].” MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, DE LEGIBUS (3.3.7). John Locke used this line to open his 
SECOND TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT (1689).  
390. See Jane Mansbridge, On the Contested Nature of the Public Good, in PRIVATE 
ACTION AND THE PUBLIC GOOD 3 (Walter W. Powell & Elisabeth Stephanie Clemens eds., 
1998). 
391. See id.  
392. See id.  
393. See also LOUGHLIN, supra note 297, at 52. 
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public law governing how the provision of public goods is to be 
balanced against other, equally legitimate, but competing concerns.394 
As per our discussion above regarding what we termed “political 
regulation,” public law, too, must effectuate this balancing via the use 
of politics. As noted by Martin Loughlin:  
[W]e might best understand the way in which [public] law 
establishes the governing framework of a state as a continuation 
of the political engagement. . . .The heterogeneity of human 
purposes and the plasticity of human judgments in combination 
ensure not only that ‘there is a clear surplus of conflict over co-
operation in human interaction’ but also that ‘there will always 
continue to be so.’395 
The state’s various forms of capitalism are indeed critical tools 
for the state’s provision of certain aspect of the public good.396 These 
capitalisms are creations of the state. And the state creates them for a 
purpose. For example, states use both Fordism and post-Fordism to 
provide national wealth and social material welfare.397 They use 
welfare capitalisms to provide security to the population;398 they use 
solidarity capitalisms to provide social and political citizenship, and 
through that national identity;399 they use state capitalisms to promote 
national development and national autonomy;400 and they use 
transnational, network capitalisms, such as those involving 
participation in transnational production chains or transnational trade, 
to promote cosmopolitanism and greater embeddedness in the world 
community.401 
Each of these particular aspects of the public good—i.e., 
material welfare, safety and security, political and social citizenship, 
sovereignty, and global integration—contributes something vital to 
the ultimate success of the project we call the state. Each therefore 
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394. See also LOUGHLIN, supra note 387, at 164 (stating: “[r]ather than treating public 
law as the unfolding of some science of political right, then, public law should be understood 
to involve an exercise in . . . negotiat[ing] between the various conflicting accounts of political 
right that form part of its evolving discourse.”). 
395. LOUGHLIN, supra note 297, at 52 (quoting from DUNN, supra note 14, at 361). 
396. See, e.g., John Maynard Keynes, National Self-Sufficiency, 22 THE YALE REV. 755 
(1933); REICH, supra note 110; see also Helleiner, supra note 123. 
397. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 77; PIORE & SABEL, supra note 45. 
398. See GOSTA ESPING-ANDERSEN, THE THREE WORLDS OF WELFARE CAPITALISM 
(2013); ROBERT E. GOODIN ET AL., THE REAL WORLDS OF WELFARE CAPITALISM (1999). 
399. See supra note 228 and accompanying text. 
400. See supra notes 197, 213 and accompanying text. 
401. See Deyo, supra note 59, at 296-97. 
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must be able to enjoy some significant degree of space in a state’s 
construction of its national economy. As we have seen, competition 
regulation regulates how this space is to be continually apportioned 
and reapportioned so as to ensure that each contributes appropriately 
and with appropriate moderation to the commonwealth that state is 
ultimately constructed both to provide and to regulate.   
In its political-regulatory balancing of the different and 
sometimes competing capitalisms in society, competition regulation 
reproduces this aspect of public law.  It governs the governing of the 
state in the sense that, contrary to the presumptions of orthodox 
model, it does not simply provide a particular kind of public good 
(i.e., social welfare). Rather it provides a regulatory framework that 
governs the way the state uses different kinds of capitalisms to 
provide different and often incommensurate kinds of public goods. 
We have seen this balancing well at play in Asia. But this 
balancing was also apparent in the North Atlantic, particularly in the 
early days of both the American and the European competition law 
regimes.402 In the United States, it was not until the 1980s that today’s 
unitary focus on productive and allocative efficiency came to be 
established as the sole, guiding light of US antitrust law.403 As noted 
by William Kovacic and quoted above,404 US competition regulators 
have continually negotiated and balanced, renegotiated and 
rebalanced, among the various forms of capitalisms and associated 
political interests.405 Similarly, in Europe, different capitalist 
visions—ordoliberalism, liberalism, social democracy—jostle 
continuously in the ever-changing landscape of European competition 

402. On the early years of the ICC and the emergent antitrust regime, see Skowronek, 
supra note 179, at 138-62, 248-84; Mark A. Covaleski, Mark W. Dirsmith & Sajay Samuel, 
The Use of Accounting Information in Governmental Regulation and Public Administration: 
The Impact of John R. Commons and Early Institutional Economists, 22 ACCOUNTING 
HISTORIAN’S J. 1 (1995); Alan Jones, Thomas M. Cooley and the Interstate Commerce 
Commission: Continuity and Change in the Doctrine of Equal Rights, 81 POL. SCI. Q. 602 
(1996). On the early years of the Sherman Antitrust Act, see WILLIAM LETWIN, LAW AND 
ECONOMIC POLICY IN AMERICA: THE EVOLUTION OF THE SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT (1981). 
See also Christopher Grandy, Original Intent and the Sherman Antitrust Act: A Re-
examination of the Consumer-Welfare Hypothesis, 53 J. ECON. HIST. 359 (1993). 
403. See Barak Y. Orbach, The Antitrust Consumer Welfare Paradox, 7 J. COMP. L. & 
ECON. 133 (2011); Orbach, supra note 4; cf. Edward Hirsch Levi, The Antitrust Laws and 
Monopoly, 14 U. CHI. L. REV. 153 (1948). 
404. See supra note 379 and accompanying text. 
405. See RUDOLPH J. R. PERITZ, COMPETITION POLICY IN AMERICA, 1888-1992 (1995); 
cf. MARTIN J. SKLAR, THE CORPORATE RECONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM, 1890-
1916: THE MARKET, THE LAW, AND POLITICS (1988).  
378 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 38:301 
law,406 as reflected most recently in the new emergence of the 
doctrinal exceptions for “general economic interests”and “solidarity” 
discussed above.407 
B. Constituting the State 
Public law does not just regulate the state; it regulates the state in 
a particular way. It regulates the state by bringing it into being.408 
Thus, for example, public law regulates how and when parliament 
may legislate by (1) structuring the creation of parliament as a public 
body, what we might call its “structuring function;” and by (2) 
defining and empowering the parliamentary statute as a regulatory 
tool—what we, following Michael Mann, might call its 
“infrastructural empowering” function.409 In other words, neither 
parliament nor the parliamentary statute exists except for the 
command of public law, and it is therefore only through the terms of 
that command that they are brought into being and empowered. 
This aspect of competition law is very evident in the context of 
Asian capitalism. Insofar as its state-structuring function is concerned, 
we see this quite clearly in the names that we have given to various 
Asian competition regimes, e.g., the “developmental state,” and the 
“competition state.”410 Insofar as the infrastructural-empowerment 
function is concerned, we see this in the various state capitalisms that 
have been a defining feature of Asian capitalism.411 But as we shall 
see below, both functions are also in evidence in North Atlantic 
competition-regulatory regimes. 
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407. See supra notes 82, 367 (on general economic interests); supra note 228 (on 
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Commission as Regulator: The Uncertain Pursuit of the Competitive Market, in REGULATING 
EUROPE 229 (Giandomenico Majone ed., 2002). 
408. See LOUGHLIN, supra note 387, at 11-12. 
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1. Constituting State Structure 
The regulation of competition plays a key role in the 
construction of both the US and European “states”, i.e., the United 
States of America and the European Union. A prime example of this 
is found in the Commerce Clause of the US Constitution.412 The 
Commerce Clause was in part a form of competition regulation: one 
of its principal intents being to regulate local markets within the new 
nation state so as to ensure that non-local domestic products were able 
to compete on equal footing with local products413—the alleged 
prevalence of local protectionism under the pre-constitutional Articles 
of Confederation being one of the principal concerns behind the 
creation of the Constitution.414 But its intent was primarily political 
rather than economic. As noted by Laurence Tribe, “the function of 
the [Commerce] clause is to ensure national solidarity, not economic 
efficiency.”415 By insuring fair and uniform competition across the 
United States, the Commerce Clause forged for the United States a 
truly national economy—one that bound the desperate regions of the 
country together in common economic interdependence. The framers 
believed that such a distinctly national economic structuring was 
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(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). See generally Albert S. Abel, The Commerce Clause in the 
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critical for securing the national unity necessary for the state to 
develop a political identity.416 
A similar dynamic can be found in post-War Europe. Here, the 
catalytic force was the German economic school known as 
“ordoliberalism,”417 as has been well described by David Gerber in 
his masterful study tellingly entitled “Constitutionalizing the 
Economy”:  
Classical [economic] liberals had been content to argue that the 
market, if left to itself, would promote economic growth and thus 
eventually enhance social welfare, but [ordoliberals] approached 
the problem from a different methodological starting point, 
referring back to the social liberals in situating such justice 
concerns in a broader context. For them, the economy was the 
primary means for integrating society around democratic and 
humane principles.418 
Under the influence of ordoliberalism, competition law played a 
critical role in the construction of West Germany’s new, post-War, 
democratic state.419 The founders of West Germany were greatly 
concerned about the possibility of a relapse back into 
authoritarianism, and Germany’s new, ordoliberal competition law 
was to prevent this from happening. Many attributed the rise of Nazi 
authoritarianism in the 1930s to the pre-War German economy’s 
strong reliance on industrial cartels as a means for creating and 
maintaining economic and social order.420 These cartels amassed large 
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concentrations of private wealth, and through these considerable 
political power. It was through the political capture of these cartels 
that the Nazi party was able to secure its authoritarian dominance of 
Germany’s national political system. By preventing such 
cartelizations, the new competition law was thought critical for 
ensuring the stability and perpetuation of West Germany’s new 
democratic state.421 
Ordoliberalism was also a guiding principle in the formulation of 
the European Union, as will be explored below.422 
2. Constituting State Power 
Also consistent with the state-constituting character of public 
law, the competition law regimes of the United States and Europe 
were not constructed simply or even primarily to promote material 
welfare; they were constructed to empower the state. 
In the United States, this is fairly obvious in the case of the 
Commerce Clause—national solidarity being itself a critical source of 
a state’s regulatory capacity.423 It is also quite evident in the early 
development of the antitrust regime. During the latter part of the 
nineteenth century, the rapid emergence in the United States of 
industrial capitalism—early Fordism—had plunged the US into crisis. 
This new kind of capitalism had allowed massive private 
accumulations of wealth that many felt the still small national state 
was powerless to control.424 
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In response, the United States developed new ways of regulating 
competition within this new capitalism, precisely so it could reassert 
national regulatory control over the national economy. This involved, 
first, the invention and empowering of a new organ of national 
regulation, our old friend the independent regulatory agency,425 which 
allowed the national state to respond more quickly to and counter 
more effectively industry efforts to privately structure market 
competition via cartelization and trusts.426 Secondly, it involved 
finding ways of re-empowering the state so that it could reassert 
national regulatory authority over this new manifestation of private 
industrial capitalism.427 Ultimately, it did this, as we have seen, by 
assigning the surplus value generated by industrial production to the 
more democratic and more diffuse consumer class rather than 
allowing it to continue to accumulate in large industrial firms,428 thus 
diminishing the ability of these firms to compromise national 
regulatory autonomy and to transcend national regulatory reach.429 
On the other side of the Atlantic, the infrastructural-empowering 
capacities of competition regulation were again on display in the role 
that such regulation played in the initial formation of what is today 
the European Union. The European Union emerged, through several 
stages, out of the European Coal and Steel Community (“ECSC”), 
founded in 1951.430 Similar to the Commerce Clause of the US 
Constitution, the ECSC was primarily a competition regulation 
regime, one whose principal intention and effect was to empower a 
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new kind of transnational political entity431 that could overcome 
Europe’s long-standing divisive local animosities.432 As noted in the 
“Schuman Declaration” proposing the establishment of that 
Community: 
 Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single 
plan. It will be built through concrete achievements which first 
create a de facto solidarity. The coming together of the nations of 
Europe requires the elimination of the age-old opposition of 
France and Germany. Any action taken must in the first place 
concern these two countries. 
 With this aim in view, the French Government . . . proposes 
that Franco-German production of coal and steel as a whole be 
placed under a common High Authority, within the framework of 
an organization open to the participation of the other countries of 
Europe. The pooling of coal and steel production should 
immediately provide for the setting up of common foundations 
for economic development as a first step in the federation of 
Europe, and will change the destinies of those regions which 
have long been devoted to the manufacture of munitions of war, 
of which they have been the most constant victims.  
 . . . .  
 By pooling basic production and by instituting a new High 
Authority, whose decisions will bind France, Germany and other 
member countries; this proposal will lead to the realization of the 
first concrete foundation of a European federation indispensable 
to the preservation of peace.433 
C. Conclusion: Towards a New Orthodoxy? 
In sum, both the US antitrust regime and European competition 
law were, no less so than the Asian model, were born out of public 
law concerns. They both took their shape via extensive processes of 
political balancing and rebalancing of numerous forms of capitalism, 
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and of the different kinds of state capacities and public goods they 
provided. Over time, however, the public-law character of these 
regimes became obscured by the multi-generational predominance 
and stability of Fordism,434 a stability that alleviated these regulatory 
regimes’ need to revisit the particular capitalist balancing they had 
ultimately settled upon. Fordism, the regulatory regimes that 
developed to control it, and the particular balances these regimes have 
struck between Fordism and other kinds of capitalism, have all been 
around for so long so as to now seem natural. This in turn has given 
these regimes, and the orthodox model that has been constructed out 
of them, their seemingly technical—as opposed to political—
character.  
But as noted in the quote that opened this Article, Fordism will 
not be eternal, and many now suspect it is nearing the end of its 
dominance.435 As this happens, the innately public law character of 
competition law—which has always been there—will again be 
returning to the fore in the North Atlantic, as it already has done in 
Asia. And as that happens, it is the Asian experience with competition 
regulation, rather than that of the North Atlantic, that may well 
provide the foundation, and properly so, for a new orthodoxy. 
CONCLUSION: WHY PUBLIC LAW? 
Given the important role economics plays in the field of 
competition law, being aware of policy questions and 
designs would help economists not only identify the 
inevitable tensions with the disciplines of law and politics 
but also understand the continuing interactions between 
economics and politics in particular.436  
 
The orthodox model invisibilizes the critical role that politics 
must play in an effective competition regulation regime. It does this 
by drawing doctrinal boundaries around what it calls “competition 
law” that delineate a narrow range of technical matters related to a 
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particular kind of capitalism—that of Fordism—and that conceptually 
isolate those matters from the rest of the larger competition-regulatory 
system. By artificially isolating competition law in this way, it creates 
the illusion that they are unrelated to and independent from other 
regulatory issues involving other forms of capitalism, and more 
critically from other regulatory issues involving how the state 
constitutes itself—an illusion is well evinced in an oft-quoted passage 
by Robert Bork’s from his germinal The Antitrust Paradox: 
A different line of attack comes from those who observe, quite 
correctly, that people value things other than consumer welfare, 
and therefore, quite incorrectly, that antitrust ought not to be 
confined to advancing that goal. As non sequiturs go, that one is 
world class.437 
Of course, from the perspective of the real world as it actually 
operates, as distinguished from Bork’s legal-formalist perspective, 
these “other things” are not non sequiturs at all. As we have seen, 
they are critical to our understanding of how competition law is to 
contribute effectively to the national regulation of the many private 
and state capitalisms that populate the national economic order. They 
are critical to our understanding of how competition law and the 
larger competition-regulation framework contribute vitally to the 
identification and constitution of the state.  
Regulating the complex interactions and interdependencies 
between these other issues and the issues that the orthodox model 
seeks to artificially isolate can only be done through politics—i.e., 
political regulation. It is simply too complex a regulatory task to be 
done juristically or bureaucratically, in the way that the orthodox 
model would advise. But in order for this political regulation to work, 
we have to adopt a competition law model that acknowledges and 
embraces the vital role that politics must play in competition 
regulation. Again, the orthodox model—with its innate fear of 
politics—does not allow us to do this. 
The experience of Asian capitalism, by contrast, does suggest 
such a model. It is a model that sees competition law as lying in 
public law rather than simply in economic law or private market 
regulation. Recognizing this highlights critical aspects of competition 
regulation to which the orthodox model blinds us. The orthodox 
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model tells us that the shape of competition regulation flows naturally 
from the essential nature of capitalism; competition law as public law 
shows us how it is competition regulation that constructs market 
capitalisms, not the other way around. The orthodox model tells us 
that market capitalism operates independently from the political state; 
competition law as public law shows us that market capitalisms 
ultimately exist to serve the political state by providing various forms 
of public good. The orthodox model tells us that the purpose of 
competition law is to maximise the benefits of market capitalism; 
competition law as public law shows us that the purpose of 
competition law is actually to balance the costs and benefits of 
various market capitalisms, both against each other, and against the 
competing aspects of the public and private good.  
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, recognizing the public 
law essence of competition law reminds us that for these reasons, the 
state’s markets, and its various capitalisms, ultimately have to be 
subordinated to politics, not the other way around. To remove politics 
from competition law is to subordinate, inevitably and without 
reflection, the needs of the society to the needs of the markets. In fact, 
markets exist to serve us.  
The competition law produced by Asian capitalism does this. It 
is therefore a better model for understanding of how competition law 
actually contributes to and interacts with both the economy and the 
society it looks to govern. In short, it is the public law model of Asian 
capitalism, and not the market-regulatory model of the North Atlantic 
capitalisms, that should be the foundation for our “orthodox” 
understandings of competition law. 
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